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Introduction 1
Introduction
The dissertation consists of four experimental studies where social preferences can act as
a motivational factor for individual decisions. “Social preferences” or “other-regarding
preferences” refer to a class of preferences, in which the decision maker does not only take
the consequences for herself into account, but also those for other persons. Additionally,
the interaction with other parties might play a role for how the consequences are evaluated
by the decision maker. We distinguish social preferences from “selfish preferences”, where
the decision maker only cares about her own outcomes.1
There is abundant evidence for social preferences in the field of experimental economics:
Across various experimental paradigms and examples including Dictator Games, Ultima-
tum Games, Trust Games and Prisoner’s Dilemmas subjects frequently do not chose their
payoff maximizing strategy. Furthermore, in studies on the distribution of financial re-
sources, subjects often prefer allocations, in which they do not receive the highest possible
payoff for their own.
Initially, models trying to explain these type of preferences mainly used an outcome-based
approach. As the name suggests, these approaches focus on the resulting distribution of
payoffs of the decision maker and other involved parties. They do not explicitly model,
how the distribution is generated. The most influential examples of this class are the
models of E. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In these kind
of models, the utility of a decision maker is derived from his own payoff as well as how it
compares to the other players’ payoffs. These models are fairly tractable and can explain
a variety of choices, where players forgo own payoffs in order to achieve a more egali-
1As in the context of experimental economics the outcomes usually correspond to monetary payoffs, we
will use these terms synonymously.
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tarian distribution. Beyond critiques on the functional form2 and the parametrization,
other studies, as for example Engelmann and Strobel (2004), question the assumption,
that difference aversion is the driving force behind the behaviors we observe. They pro-
vide evidence for behavior being motivated to a greater extent by concerns for efficiency
(maximization of total payoffs) and “maximin preferences” (increasing the welfare of the
least well-off player). In response to this critique, both Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) and
E. Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt (2006), argue that it boils down to a tradeoff between equity
and efficiency, which players are facing.
In reaction to evidence, that behavior is not solely motivated by the resulting payoffs, a
second class of models, so called intention-based models, have emerged. The basic concept
is that players reward kind actions and punish unkind actions. The idea of examining
players’ intentions is already found in papers of Rabin (1993) and Blount (1995). Rabin
proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, named “fairness equilibrium”. This concept
allows to take other players’ actions and beliefs into account and can model reciprocal
behavior. Blount studys intentions in the context of an Ultimatum Game. The author
shows, subjects do not penalize other players for unequal offers, if the proposer is not
responsible for those. The most influential model in this class is Charness and Rabin
(2002). In their model, the decision maker assigns different weights to the payoffs of other
persons, which depend on their behavior towards the decision maker. In that way, the
model provides a richer framework as previous models, because it is both able to capture
a variety of distributional preferences and to account also for motives such as reciprocity.
There are though some open questions left, as for example, which kind of behavior is seen
as kind or unkind. An encompassing definition is hardly possible. Usually social norms
and beliefs of the interacting persons play an important role here. Following this concept,
a lot of different extensions emerged, as for example Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004),
who apply the concept of reciprocity to sequential games and Falk and Fischbacher (2006),
who incorporate both players’ actions and intentions into their model.
2For example in E. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the amount of disutility a decision maker faces is constant
for each monetary unit lagging behind the reference group.
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Despite various attempts to explain behavior, there are still many further relevant factors,
which are difficult to incorporate into a single model. In the following, the more important
ones are briefly discussed:
There is clear evidence that facing the same situation repeatedly can lead to changes
in behavior, thus learning effects might exist. For example, even selfish players increase
their offers in Ultimatum Games or Bargaining Games, if their previous offers were mostly
rejected (see Cooper & Dutcher, 2011 for a meta-analysis). Another evidence is how
cooperative players switch to defection in Prisoners’ Dilemma Games, after they are faced
with several repetitions of defection. Further aspects are procedural fairness and diffusion
of responsibility. In a sequential Battle-of-Sexes Game, Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels
(2005) find that even unfair outcomes are accepted if they are the result of a fair procedure.
Thus, a lot depends on how the action of a person is perceived by the other player(s),
which links to the role of intentions. We will examine the consequences of procedural
fairness in more detail in chapter 1.
Another question, which is usually ignored, is to specify exactly whose payoffs are decision-
relevant. By convention, in experiments one often refers to the persons, with whom the
player is directly interacting. But this reasoning is not entirely convincing. One could
also argue that the whole group of participants forms the reference group or the reference
group is even constituted by persons outside the lab.3 To assess this factor, there are many
studies about how behavior is influenced by group identity. They provide a rather mixed
picture of results (see for example Chen & Li, 2009 for an overview). There are many
more aspects to consider, which refer to the context of the decision-making situation, such
as framing effects, the influence of socioeconomic variables, the choice set, but we will not
discuss them in more detail here.
In all of the upcoming studies the focus is on situations in which groups of two players
interact with each other in a way, such that their behavior mutually can influence each
others’ payoffs. Given the evidence from previous studies, social preferences play an
3One participant in the study about antisocial behavior justified his decision to destroy money of some
other participant with the argument, that in his point of view the money is not lost, as it is belonging
to the taxpayer and can be used for better purposes than paying students for this study.
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important role for subjects’ decisions in this type of situations.
The structure of the thesis and research questions of each projects are as follows: In
chapter 1 we report results of an experiment examining how the fairness of the endow-
ment generating process influences subjects’ propensity to costly destroy money of other
participants. Chapter 2 is co-authored with Graciela Kuechle. There we analyze results
of a study about gender differences in bargaining behavior in an environment in which
subjects either have or do not have knowledge about the gender of the involved parties.
In chapter 3 we investigate if subjects more often play a Nash equilibrium strategy, if they
are mutually informed about each other’s preferences over payoff tuples which correspond
to the monetary outcomes of the games. This chapter is based on collaborative work with
Christoph Brunner and Florian Kauffeldt. Finally, chapter 4 deals with the question of
how the degree of “social capital”, measured by subjects’ behavior in a trust game, is
affected by being exposed to different payment schemes beforehand, which vary in their
degree of competitiveness. This chapter is co-authored with Dietmar Fehr, Stefan Traut-
mann and Yilong Xu. The last chapter summarizes the results and offers some concluding
remarks on the impact social preferences have on decision making.
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Chapter 1
Antisocial Preferences
Do people exhibit more antisocial behavior if the income allocat-
ing process has been unfair?
Abstract
We examine whether an unfair process of income allocation leads to a higher degree of
antisocial behavior. In order to test this hypothesis, we run an experiment where we
vary the way players’ endowments are determined: by a fair, random, or unfair process.
The initial distribution has a certain degree of inequality, which is held constant across
treatments. After receiving their income, subjects can anonymously reduce the income of
another player at a cost. The overall frequency and percentage of destruction is similar and
not significantly different across treatments. Surprisingly, even if money is allocated in an
unfair manner, subjects do not destroy more. We furthermore elicit subjects’ perceptions
about the fairness of the income-generating process. They are in line with the intended
treatment effect, but we find almost no correlation between subjects’ fairness evaluation
and the propensity to burn money. The findings indicate that the degree of antisocial
behavior is rather constant in this context and independent of the fairness of the income-
allocating process. Subjects’ justifications of their decision and insights of related studies
suggest that the decision to destroy other’s income depends a lot on whether other subjects
can be held responsible for the initial (unfair) distribution.
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1.1 Introduction
Many economic experiments have demonstrated that subjects exhibit antisocial behavior.
The term antisocial behavior in this context is used in the sense that subjects destroy
each other’s income without any material benefits to themselves, even if it is costly.
The amount burned in this way varies a lot, and depends on the exact framework in
which subjects are acting. The percentage of destruction in such experiments ranges from
below 5% to over 60% of total endowment/income.4 Previous studies focus on the effect
of variables like the costs of burning (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001), the degree of anonymity
(Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009) and relative income positions (Abbink, Masclet, & van Veelen,
2011 as well as Grossman, Komai, et al., 2013), just to name a few. For some factors
such as anonymity and the price of burning, the results seem expectable and quite clear:
Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) find that a higher degree of anonymity leads to more money
burning. In the experiment of Zizzo and Oswald (2001) subjects burn significantly more
money, when costs are very low (2.5% and 5% of the amount destroyed) compared to
a higher price (25%). However, for other factors such as the relative income position,
there are contradictory results so far concerning the amount of destruction: Abbink et al.
(2011) show that subjects with a similar rank in the income distribution destroy more,
while Dawes et al. (2007) find an opposite effect.
These studies suggest that the degree of destruction depends a lot on the context of the
situation. In most studies discussed above, there exists a certain degree of inequality in the
initial income distribution. This potentially creates a conflict: Under some circumstances
these differences might be accepted, while on others subjects might have the desire to
change the initial unequal allocation. Taking into account prominent theories of justice,
one key factor is the fairness of the money allocating process. This aspect has not
been examined in the context of antisocial behavior so far.
In this study we investigate, if the degree of antisocial behavior can depend on “how fair”
subjects view the money allocating process. The natural hypothesis we want to test is, if
participants burn more money, when the endowment allocating process has been unfair,
4In the context of this study we use the terms endowment and income synonymously.
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compared to when it has been fair.
If we use the term fair in the context of our study, e.g. for labeling the treatments
and forming the hypothesis, it mostly corresponds to the concept called process fair-
ness/procedural fairness. Concretely this means that subjects’ incomes are positively
correlated to their time and effort spent during the experiment. We also use the term to
describe the subjective fairness evaluations of our participants concerning the endowment-
allocating process. These fairness evaluations are also based on the concept of process
fairness and the respective question is framed accordingly. Process fairness has to be dis-
tinguished from the one of outcome/distributional fairness. Both play an important role
in assessing a distribution of resources. Distributional fairness emphasizes the resulting
distribution, while process fairness focuses on the way how this distribution is generated.
So one can say, process fairness takes more an ex ante view, while outcome fairness judges
the result more ex post. Consider for example a lottery, which awards the winner a high
prize and the rest receives nothing. If everyone has the same probability of winning, this
mechanism satisfies the criterion of process fairness, but not that one of outcome fairness.
Generally, in economic experiments, endowment is mostly provided in the form of windfall
gains -the most common way- or as earned money. In the latter case participants usually
perform a (real-effort-) task according to which their initial income is assigned. Evidence
suggests the process determining initial income affects subsequent subjects’ behavior: In
an Ultimatum Game lower offers are accepted if the proposer has earned his role by
winning a logic game (Hoffman et al., 1994). Similarly, Oxoby and Spraggon (2008)
observe larger transfers in a Dictator Game, if the recipient has created the amount of
money to be divided by his performance in a problem solving task.
Most fairness norms and theories on procedural justice emphasize the role of effort as
an important factor justifying differences in the distribution of (financial) resources (e.g.,
Konow, 2003, p. 1207). In contrast there are differences resulting from luck, or factors
which are congenital such as abilities or talents. Usually people favor a more even dis-
tribution if initial differences result from external reasons (e.g. a handicap) compared
to internal reasons (e.g. lower effort provided or bad decisions made in the past) (see
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Faravelli, 2007 and Konow, 2001). Roemer (1998) goes even one step further and argues,
that effort can also be partially seen as some characteristic of type, for which people can-
not be held responsible completely. For further information on theories of distributional
justice see Cappelen et al. (2007) and for an overview of results in empirical social choice
see Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012).
A closely related paper is D. Fehr (2018). The author examines in a lab experiment the
relationship between increasing inequality and the tendency to burn other’s income. He
finds that increasing inequality leads to more money burning, but only if the underlying
process creating this higher inequality is unfair. In contrast, if higher inequality can be
unambiguously attributed to higher effort, subjects do not destroy more income.
Taking all this together, a possible conjecture can be that the perceived fairness of en-
dowment determination is an important factor influencing the decision to change/destroy
others’ income.
The results of this study are important for the real world. One can think of many situa-
tions, in which resources are assigned by different procedures, which vary in their perceived
fairness. For example companies provide different remuneration schemes depending on
individual performance. Individual performance is though often not easy to measure and
its value contribution can be hard to disentangle. Thus, there can be great heterogeneity
of the acceptance of the income determining mechanism. If this process is perceived as
unfair, it can trigger negative emotions and harm individual productivity. Hence, from
society’s point of view it is an essential question, if the resulting allocation is approved or
not. The main difference to our experiment probably is that antisocial behavior usually
is not directly possible in the real world. But in some cases even (costly) sabotage might
occur.
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1.2 Experimental Design
The experiment is pen and paper based and consists of three treatments:
1. Treatment “Fair”
2. Treatment “Random”
3. Treatment “Unfair”
All treatments have the same basic structure, consisting of two parts: First, the en-
dowment determination phase and in the second part the destruction decision. Finally,
subjects fill out a questionnaire and then receive their final payoff. As endowment, half of
the participants receive a high (e10) and the other half a low (e5) amount of money.
The only difference between the treatments is the way in which participants are assigned
these values:
In the random treatment, the endowment is determined by a lottery. Subjects pick up a
sealed envelope from a box containing a note that they either are allocated e5 or e10.
They are told that 50% of the participants receive the high amount and the other 50% the
low one. This treatment is designed as a “baseline”, to be comparable with most of the
other money burning experiments with similar parameter values, in which endowment
is provided in the form of “windfall gains”. In the other two treatments, the subject
pool is divided into two groups, the “early group” and the “late group”. Members of
the early group have to perform a real effort task, involving correcting IQ-tests from
another experiment. The subjects of the late group are told to show-up 30min later
for the experiment and do not have to do any work. In the fair treatment all members
of the early group receive e10 as endowment and participants from the late group are
assigned e5. The payment scheme in the unfair treatment is exactly reversed: That
means, subjects showing up early only receive e5 and the others, who do not have to do
any work, obtain the higher value of e10. The whole procedure is common knowledge.
That means, in each treatment all subjects are informed what kind of “task” both groups
of the respective treatment have to complete and how they are rewarded for it.
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After the phase of endowment determination each subject is given the opportunity to
spend a fraction of his or her income to anonymously destroy some or all money of
a randomly selected other participant. The second part of the experiment is identical
across all treatments. The costs of burning money are 10% of the chosen amount, so
for every Euro a subject wants to destroy, he or she has to pay 10 Cents. Subjects can
choose any value ranging from zero up to the total income of the other person (either
e5 or e10). Furthermore, in the instructions it was pointed out, destruction is only
optional and one does not necessarily have to subtract any money. Framing here was as
neutral as possible to avoid experimenter-demand effects in any direction. All decisions
are made anonymously. For that purpose subjects generate a code, which corresponds to
their identity and decisions during the experiment. Destruction decisions are made using
strategy method: Every subject indicates which amount she or he would like to reduce, if
the other person has an income of e5 or e10. Remember that subjects know which task
the other participant (with an endowment of e5 and e10) had to perform beforehand.
Afterwards, participants are randomly paired in groups-of-two. In each of these groups,
only one of the two decisions is actually carried out (“unilateral destruction”). So in
the end only half of the destruction decisions are implemented. The idea is to prevent
motives like preemptive retaliation or negative reciprocity. If both decisions were to
be implemented, it would be possible, that some players would not want to burn any
money at all, but have the belief the others would do so and therefore would want to
preemptively retaliate. This is maybe one of the reasons for surprisingly high burning
rates in experiments, like for example, in Zizzo and Oswald (2001) or the occurrence of
vendettas in repeated money burning games Bolle et al. (2014). After everyone has made
his or her choice, the experimenters randomly draw which decisions of the groups are
actually implemented and then calculate the resulting payoffs. Meanwhile, subjects fill
out a questionnaire, for which they receive additional money (e3). In the questionnaire
subjects are asked, as how fair they rate the money allocating process and what are their
motives for burning (or not burning) money. At last, subjects receive feedback about
which decisions are carried out and their final payoff.
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The experiment was conducted in 2013 in the experimental lab of the University of Hei-
delberg. Overall 119 subjects, mostly students, took part (42% had their major in Eco-
nomics). Recruitment was carried out with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Each treatment
included 3 sessions, with an average duration of 45-60min. Further details are summa-
rized in table 1.1 below. Average earnings were around e10 per subject, with payoffs
ranging from e3-13.
Table 1.1: Treatment overview
Treatment Procedure Sessions Subjects
Fair Real-effort task 3 41
Random Lottery 3 34
Unfair Real-effort task 3 44
1.3 Hypotheses
The first hypothesis is about whether subjects evaluate the fairness of the process of
endowment determination differently across treatments.
Hypothesis 1: The fair treatment is rated as fairer than the random treatment, which
again is rated as fairer than the unfair treatment.
Hypothesis two compares destruction decisions between the treatments.5 Considering the
discussion above about social norms and theories of distributional justice, it is natural to
suppose that people destroy less money, if they perceive the endowment allocating process
as rather fair . This hypothesis is also supported by concepts from social psychology
such as “Equity Theory” by Adams (1963). Accordingly, people tend to accept income
differences as long as the proportion of effort to payoff is similar across all participants.
If people perceive this relation as unbalanced, they experience negative emotions, leading
to actions restoring a more even situation. In our setting, we would expect subjects
viewing the income allocation as unfair to reduce the income of other players to some
5The argument in this paragraph is based on the assumption that subjects actually evaluate the
endowment-allocating process in the treatments as differently fair. This assumption will be confirmed
later on. Especially the process in the unfair treatment is rated as clearly less fair than the one in the
other two treatments.
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extent until subjective equity is restored. In the unfair treatment of our experiment this
relation is clearly more unbalanced than in the fair one. Therefore one would expect
higher destruction rates there to reduce differences in the effort to payoff-ratio. In a
similar fashion, models of Inequality Aversion (as e.g. E. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999 predict
this kind of behavior, if effort is seen as some form of monetary costs).
Hypothesis 2: Most destruction is chosen in the unfair treatment unfair and least in
the fair treatment.
To explain the composition of overall destruction, one has to look more into detail of
the behavior of specific income classes. There are four different cases to distinguish,
concerning the endowment of the decision maker and the target of destruction: (low,
low), (low, high), (high, low), (high, high). The first value refers to the endowment of the
decision maker and the second to the endowment of the target. According to the theories
mentioned before, a substantial part of the predicted differences in overall destruction
should stem from the combination (low, high). In this combination there are the highest
differences in the effort-to-payoff ratio, especially in the unfair treatment. This leads to
hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: Destruction in the combination (low, high) is highest in the unfair treat-
ment and lowest in the fair treatment.
In the cases, in which both subjects have the same endowment (low, low) and (high, high)
the situation is completely symmetric. Both parties have to perform the same kind of task
and receive the same reward for it. There might be a certain number of subjects having
inherently antisocial preferences. As there is no clear reason why this number should
differ depending on the treatment, we expect no treatment effect in these combinations.
Hypothesis 4: Destruction in the combinations (low, low) and (high, high) is the same
across all treatments.
Finally for the combination (high, low), most theories do not predict subjects with a
higher endowment would destroy earnings of those with a lower endowment. Only in the
fair treatment it is possible to imagine a subject receiving e10 to feel disadvantaged. This
would be the case, if she evaluates the additional e5 of endowment as inferior to the effort
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she had to exert beforehand.
Hypothesis 5: Destruction in the combination (high, low) is highest in the fair treatment
and lowest in the unfair treatment.
One could refine hypothesis 5 by adding, that destruction in the combination (high, low)
is lower than in the combination (low, high). But the comparison of these two cases is
more complicated, because the amount of endowment of the target differs. Therefore one
cannot really compare absolute values in destruction between these two cases. Possible
solutions might be, to look at the percentages or frequencies of destruction here.
1.4 Experimental Results
1.4.1 Fairness Evaluations
We first check if the treatments work as intended. In hypothesis 1 we anticipate that
participants will find the unfair treatment least fair. To test this hypothesis we ask all
subjects at the end of the experiment to evaluate as how fair they perceived the endowment
assigning mechanism in their treatment. They can rate the process on a scale ranging
from 1-5, where 1 means they perceived the mechanism as “very fair”, 3 corresponds to
“neutral” and 5 to “very unfair”. The results are shown in table 1.2 below.
Table 1.2: Fairness evaluations
Treatment Subjects Fairness Evaluations(average)
Fair 41 2.4
Random 34 2.5
Unfair 44 4.3∗∗∗
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
As expected, the participants rate the unfair treatment as clearly less fair than the other
two treatments. The scale should be interpreted as ordinal, therefore we use a Wilcox-
rank-sum test to compare the fairness perceptions pairwise between treatments. The
difference of treatment Unfair compared to each of the other ones is highly significant
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(p < 0.001). While there is no significant difference between treatment Fair and Random
(p = 0.96). A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test of comparing all treatments simultaneously
leads to the same result. The results (partly6) support hypothesis 1:
Result 1: The fair treatment is rated as similarly fair as the random treatment. Both
are rated as much fairer than the unfair treatment.
1.4.2 Destruction Decisions (Pooled)
In our experiment we measure destruction in two ways: Either as destruction frequency
or as percentage of destruction. The first case corresponds to the number of decisions,
in which one subject wants to reduce the payoff of another subject, divided by the total
number of decisions. The latter case corresponds to the amount of money intended to
burn divided by the endowment of the other subject. The hypotheses in general refer to
both measures.
Overall destruction is moderate and less pronounced compared to other money burning
experiments.7 As explained before we measure destruction activity in two ways: De-
struction frequency and percentage of destruction. We have two destruction decisions per
subject. This amounts to a total of 238 decisions. The average burning frequency over
all treatments is 23.5% and the average percentage of destruction is 10.8%. Results for
each treatment are summarized in table 1.3 and illustrated in figure 1.1.
For the analysis we focus on the percentage of destruction, as this variable contains
additional information compared to the mere frequency. Note again, that subjects make
their decisions using the strategy method, specifying for each of the two cases (the other
player has either an endowment of e5 or e10) the amount they would like to reduce
from her. For the computation of our variables (burning frequency and percentage of
destruction) we take both decisions into account, no matter, if they are actually carried
out or not. Therefore the percentage of destruction per subject is calculated by adding up
6As the difference in evaluations between the fair and the random treatment is not significant, the
hypothesis is only partly confirmed. Maybe the difference between these two treatments would have
been bigger, if participants also would have been told the allocation mechanisms of the other treatments.
7For example in Zizzo and Oswald (2001) about 70% of subjects burn money at a cost of 10% of the
chosen amount and in Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) ca. 25% do so, but at higher costs of 20%.
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Table 1.3: Destruction decisions
Treatment
Number of
decisions
Destruction
frequency
Percentage of
destruction
Pooled 238
23.1%
(0.39)
10.7%
(0.21)
Fair 82
20.7%
(0.40)
11.8%
(0.26)
Random 68
25.0%
(0.41)
11.8%
(0.21)
Unfair 88
23.9%
(0.37)
9.0%
(0.15)
Standard errors (absolute values) in parentheses.
Figure 1.1: Overall destruction frequency and percentage of destruction
both intended destruction values and dividing them by the sum of the target endowments
(which corresponds to e5 + e10 = e15 in every case).
For the statistical analysis we use a Wilcoxon-rank sum/Mann-Whitney test (for pairwise
comparisons of treatments) and a Kruskal-Wallis test to compare destruction decisions
simultaneously across all treatments. We first look at the pooled values and later examine
the behavior of specific income classes both of the decision maker and the target. We
additionally run a linear regression with the amount of destruction as outcome variable
and the treatments as dummy variables (+controls). We do this both for pooled values and
for controlling for specific income classes. Results of the regressions can be found in section
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1.4.5. For the discussion and conclusion we focus on the results of the Wilcoxon-rank sum
test, as some of the underlying assumptions of the regression analysis are not fully met
(such as e.g. the assumption that the error terms are normally distributed). Looking
at the pooled values, there are no significant differences across treatments concerning
the amount of destruction (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.74). A pairwise comparison of
treatments leads to similar results. In the unfair treatment, average values are even
slightly lower than in the random one.
Result 2: There are no significant differences concerning overall destruction rates across
treatments.
There are two potential explanations: Either the treatments do not have a strong effect
on individual decisions to destroy somebody else’s income, or we have multiple effects
going in opposite directions and balancing each other on average.8 To check the second
point we take a closer look at the behavior of specific income classes.
1.4.3 Behavior of Specific Income Classes
Case 1: Combination (low, high)
In the first case we examine destruction behavior of subjects receiving a low endowment
(e5) targeting subjects with a high endowment (e10). Average percentage destruction9
per treatment is displayed in figure 1.2 below. Destruction rates are highest in the unfair
treatment, but they do not differ much across treatments. Comparing treatments pairwise
using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we find no significant differences in destruction rates.
8It could for example be the case that in the unfair treatment subjects burn more money from players
with a high endowment of e10 compared to the other treatments, but less from players with the lower
value of e5. This would overall also lead to similar destruction rates across treatments.
9Note again that these are all intended values as the actual destruction, which is finally implemented is
randomly determined.
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Figure 1.2: Average percentage destruction if target has e10
Result 3: There are no significant differences across treatments concerning destruction
rates for the combination (low, high).
Hypothesis 3, in which we expected substantial differences in destruction rates across
treatments, is not supported by the evidence. Possible explanations will be discussed later.
Case 2 and 3: Combinations (low, low) and (high, high)
For these two cases average destruction rates are displayed in figures 1.3 and 1.4. In
the first case, when both subjects have an endowment of e5, it seems there are some
differences across the fair and the unfair treatment. But due to low destruction rates on
general these differences are not significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = 0.36). The other
pairwise comparisons of treatments as well as the case, when both subjects are endowed
with e10 also show no significant differences.
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Figure 1.3: Average percentage destruction if target has e5
Figure 1.4: Average percentage destruction if target has e10
Therefore, hypothesis 4 can mostly be confirmed.
Result 4: There are no significant differences across treatments concerning destruction
rates for the combinations (low, low) and (high, high).
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Case 4: Combination (high, low)
In the last case, most models and theories predict low destruction rates overall, as the
decision maker is in a privileged position anyway. Results are displayed in figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Average destruction if target has e5
In contrast to those predictions, differences across treatments are noticeable in this case,
especially between the random and the unfair treatment. They are close to but still not
significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = 0.14).10
Result 5: There are no significant differences across treatments concerning destruction
rates for the combination (high, low).
Looking at figure 1.5 this may seem surprising, but as mentioned before, the reason for
most results being not significant are low destruction frequencies overall. To illustrate
that point, we take a closer look at the data on an individual level for the last combination
(high, low). In the random treatment in 5 out of 17 decisions, subjects decide to reduce
somebody’s payoff. Additionally, every time they chose a rather high amount and in 2
cases even the entire endowment of the group member is destroyed. In contrast, in the
10As we will see in the regression in section 1.4.5, the interaction term of the unfair treatment and the
income of the decision maker is also close to being significant. So it seems there is the tendency that
in the unfair treatment subjects with e10 destroy less money from those having e5 compared to the
other treatments.
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unfair treatment money is burned only in 3 out of 22 decisions and only to a very little
extent in each case. That leads to high percentage differences on average, driven only by a
few single decisions in the random treatment and explains why the difference between the
random and the unfair treatment is not significant. Two of those subjects burning money
in the random treatment state in the questionnaire as reason for their decision: They
expected “the other participant would have done the same, if he or she had been given
the opportunity to do so.” Obviously the motive of preemptive retaliation still seems
to be a relevant factor, even though the design allows only unilateral destruction decisions.
The only significant effect found is within the unfair treatment for pooled decisions, while
examining which endowment class is more prone to be target of destruction. Pooling in
this case means, we consider both the decisions made by subjects having an endowment of
e5 or e10. The endowment of the target is held constant in this case. As one can see in
figure 1.6, the percentage of endowment destroyed of those in the unfair treatment, who
received an endowment of e10 is much higher than the amount reduced from subjects
having e5.
Figure 1.6: Average destruction if target has e5
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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These differences are clearly significant (Wilcoxon rank sum Test, p = 0.016; two tailed)
and would even be larger, if one compared absolute values instead of percentage ones. As
figure 1.6 suggests, this effect is mainly driven by the fact that subjects with an endowment
of e5 (target has e5) is less money subtracted in the unfair treatment compared to the
other treatments. In the other treatments, differences are insignificant.
Result 6: Within the unfair treatment the percentage destruction targeting subjects hav-
ing a high endowment is significantly higher than the percentage targeting those with a
low endowment.
Besides counterweighting effects of different income classes, another reason for the simi-
lar burning rates across treatments could be that participants burning decisions are not
strongly affected by their fairness evaluations. In the next section we analyze the assess-
ments of those subjects burning any positive amount of money and those who decide not
to do so.
1.4.4 Correlation of Fairness Evaluations and
Destruction Decisions
As shown before, subjects rate the unfair treatment as clearly less fair than the other
two treatments. Nevertheless, their judgments do not seem to (strongly) affect their
destruction decisions. Looking at the correlation of one subject’s burning decision (yes=1
or no=0) and her fairness evaluation of the treatment, there is almost no correlation at
all (Spearman’s rho=0.11; Test of independence p = 0.23). The figures are similar, if you
control for specific income combinations. Therefore it seems, those subjects who make
use of the opportunity to destroy another player’s endowment, do not mainly act in this
way, because they perceive the endowment determining mechanism as unfair.
Result 7: Negative fairness evaluations do not trigger subjects’ decisions to reduce an-
other player’s payoff in this context.
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1.4.5 Regression Analysis
In this section we report the results of the regression analysis. This allows us to per-
form the analysis with demographics and other controls. Results are similar as before.
Analogously to section 1.4.2, we first look at pooled values of destruction. We use the
percentage of destruction as the dependent variable. An alternative specification would
be a regression with the destruction decision as binary outcome. But as discussed, this
analysis additionally incorporates the magnitude of destruction and provides us with more
detailed results.
Results of the pooled regression are displayed in table 1.4. None of the treatments have a
significant effect on destruction rates. Male subjects and economists show more antisocial
behavior, while people, who donate to charity destroy significantly less money.
Table 1.4: Regression: Pooled destruction (in percent)
Treatments only Treatments with controls
T fair -0.028 -2.465
(4.864) (4.827)
T unfair -2.815 -6.329
(4.788) (4.973)
Male 6.170
(4.097)
Economics 7.747+
(3.935)
Charity -8.134∗
(4.050)
Constant 11.784∗∗ 12.818∗
(3.596) (5.296)
Observations 119 119
R2 0.004 0.083
Standard errors in parentheses.
Destruction is measured by adding up both intended values and
dividing them by sum of endowments of the targets (=15).
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.5: Regression: Destruction behavior of specific income classes (in percent)
Target has 5 Target has 10 Target has 5 Target has 10
T fair=1 5.322 4.045 3.416 1.278
(7.659) (7.149) (7.520) (7.243)
Income 10=1 14.706+ 1.412 14.153+ 0.989
(8.052) (7.516) (7.724) (7.439)
T fair=1 X Income 10=1 -15.287 -5.971 -16.701 -5.122
(10.892) (10.166) (10.547) (10.158)
T unfair=1 -2.968 5.917 -6.732 2.107
(7.581) (7.076) (7.452) (7.178)
T unfair=1 X Income 10=1 -16.797 -8.912 -15.451 -8.622
(10.721) (10.007) (10.258) (9.880)
Male 3.792 7.078
(4.597) (4.428)
Economics 9.554∗ 6.375
(4.387) (4.225)
Charity -12.360∗∗ -6.426
(4.499) (4.333)
Constant 7.059 9.765+ 11.626 9.975
(5.694) (5.314) (7.224) (6.958)
Observations 119 119 119 119
R2 0.072 0.016 0.177 0.072
Standard errors in parentheses.
In this regression the income of the target is held constant and the income of the decision maker
is used as dummy variable. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In table 1.5 we report the results by specific income combinations, both for the decision
maker and the target. In each regression the income of the target is held constant. Both
models are estimated with and without controls. The income of the decision maker is
used as an explanatory dummy variable. We also look at interaction effects between
the treatment variable and the income of the decision maker. The treatments have no
significant effect on the destruction decision. When the target and the decision maker
have an income of e5, a higher percentage of the target’s income is deducted than in the
case when the decision maker has an income of e10. This effect is weakly significant,
but only in the random treatment. In the fair and unfair treatment this relationship is
1. Antisocial Preferences 24
exactly reversed. There, less money is subtracted from subjects with e5 by those with
an income of e10. As before, the interaction effect is not statistically significant. This
might be the case, because of rather low destruction rates in general.
1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the extent of antisocial behavior in a money burning experiment,
in which endowment is determined in different ways, varying in their degree of fairness.
This is the first study, which focuses on the fairness of the money allocating process, while
in most other comparable experiments, money is provided in the form of windfall gains.
Altogether, we find moderate degrees of antisocial behavior in all treatments. However,
there are no significant differences in destruction rates across the treatments, even if one
controls for specific income classes. One reason might be that individual burning decisions
in this context do not to depend much on the perceived fairness of the treatment. This is
shown by the results of the questionnaire. There is no correlation between the individual
fairness assessment of the procedure and the decision to burn money. Below we discuss
several possible explanations for this result:
First, it could be that the fraction of people showing antisocial behavior is rather con-
stant and independent of the context: Some evidence for this hypothesis comes from
Sadrieh and Schro¨der (2012) and Zhang and Ortmann (2013). They both suggest, there
is some relatively constant fraction of people exhibiting both pro- and antisocial behav-
ior, depending on the exact choice set they are offered (e.g. Joy of Destruction Game or
Dictator Game). Sadrieh and Schro¨der assume these so called “influencers” derive their
utility mainly from having the power to change the payoff of others, no matter in which
direction. This argument goes in a similar direction as experimenter demand or boredom
effects. By these effects participants also gain utility from the process in which payoffs
are generated and not only from the final distributional consequences (e.g. They want to
be “active” or have “fun”, while taking part in the experiment). This is especially true
for low stakes scenarios, as is most often the case in standard economic experiments. But
there is also abundant evidence against this argument: For example in Zizzo and Oswald
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(2001) or in D. Fehr (2018) the amount of destruction varies a lot as treatment parameters
change and has very low values in some cases.
An alternative explanation is uncovered by looking into responses to our questionnaire:
Several participants state as their reason for not reducing somebody else’s payoff, that
they do not like the endowment allocation mechanism, but see it “not as the fault of the
other subject”. Two aspects are important here: First, strictly speaking, the procedure
of endowment determination is ex ante also random across all treatments: Subjects are
randomly assigned to one of these treatments, as well as to the early or late group. Pre-
sumably, some participants perceive the whole mechanism as a sort of (unfair) “lottery”,
in which some participants are lucky (the ones who do not have to do any work and
receive the high endowment) and others are not. Adopting this view, one could argue
that the criterion of process fairness is satisfied here, as all participants had ex ante the
same chances being in each of the possible positions.
And secondly, subjects in our experiment have no opportunity to balance initial differ-
ences. Possibly, because of this they are not blamed or held responsible for these differ-
ences and therefore are not target of destruction more often. This would explain why
destruction rates are at a low level in all treatments.
For both explanations we find clear evidence in other studies: In Bolton et al. (2005)
“unfair” (in the sense of strongly unequal) outcomes in an Ultimatum Game are widely
accepted, if they are determined by a fair (random) procedure, in which the players both
had the same chance to receive the favorable outcome. Furthermore, they find that unfair
offers are only frequently rejected, if the proposer had the chance to choose a more equal
allocation, but not if he had no other choice. In a similar fashion, Blount (1995) finds
that much lower offers than common are accepted in the Ultimatum Game, if these offers
are randomly generated by a computer instead by the participant himself. E. Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004) also provide additional evidence for the second point: They examine
second and third order punishment in distributional choices. In their experiment subjects
play a Dictator Game. In one treatment the recipient himself can, after seeing the decision,
costly punish the dictator. In another treatment a neutral third party has the right to do
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so. Punishment for low transfers is widespread and used both by the recipients and also
neutral third parties. So, there is clear evidence, that if people violate common sharing
norms, they get sanctioned. The main difference to our experiment is that people have no
option to change initial endowments. Thus we can presume that destruction rates would
have been much higher - especially in the unfair treatment - if subjects were offered an
option to redistribute incomes.
Therefore we can conclude that antisocial behavior in our experiment is probably so low,
even in the unfair treatment, because subjects cannot be held responsible for the resulting
(unfair) distribution.
The latter explanation could be tested by performing a similar experiment and adding
an additional stage, in which subjects with the high endowment can transfer some share
to the ones with the low endowment before the destruction decision is made. Or instead
the design could be changed such that the high endowment is not directly allocated,
but subjects are assigned the right to choose one of these two values (that means in the
unfair treatment participants from the late group would have the right to choose which
endowment they would like to receive). Then we would expect a much stronger treatment
effect on destruction rates targeting those subjects who did not redistribute.
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Appendix
A.1 Instructions (in German)
Experiment Anleitung                                     Platz-Nr.______ 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme und herzlich willkommen zu diesem Experiment!  
Bitte sprechen Sie ab jetzt nicht mehr miteinander und schalten Sie ihre Mobiltelefone aus. 
Wenn Sie eine Frage haben, heben Sie Ihre Hand, wir kommen dann zu Ihnen an den Platz 
und beantworten Ihnen diese soweit möglich. 
Bei diesem Experiment geht es darum, Entscheidungen zu treffen. Sie haben die Möglichkeit, 
durch diese Entscheidungen Geld zu verdienen, welches Ihnen am Ende des Experiments 
anonym und in bar ausbezahlt wird. Der genaue Geldbetrag hängt ab von den von Ihnen 
getroffenen Entscheidungen, sowie den Entscheidungen Ihrer Mitspieler. 
Das Experiment hat zwei unterschiedliche Anfangszeiten für je die Hälfte der Teilnehmer. 
Wer zu welchem Zeitpunkt startet, wurde im Vorfeld per Zufall bestimmt. Diejenigen 
Teilnehmer, die zum „offiziellen“ Termin eingeladen wurden, bekommen für etwa 25-
30min eine Aufgabe, die sie erledigen müssen. 
Dabei handelt es sich um die Korrektur von ausgefüllten Bögen eines IQ-Tests für ältere 
Personen, die aus einem kürzlich durchgeführten Experiment der Uni Heidelberg stammen 
und noch nicht ausgewertet wurden. Die Teilnehmer bekommen eine Lösungsschablone und 
haben die Aufgabe, zu ermitteln wie viele Punkte bei jeder Aufgabe erzielt wurden. 
Die Teilnehmer, die zum späteren Zeitpunkt beginnen, müssen keine solche Aufgabe 
erledigen und starten gleichzeitig mit der ersten Hälfte der Personen zum zweiten Teil des 
Experiments, der wiederum für alle identisch ist. 
Die Teilnehmer, die zuvor die Aufgabe erledigt haben erhalten ein Einkommen von 10€ 
[Treatment unfair: 5€], diejenigen, die später begonnen haben bekommen ein Einkommen 
von 5€ [Treatment unfair: 10€]. 
[Treatment Zufall: Zuerst wird die Höhe Ihres Anfangseinkommens ermittelt.                                                        
Dieses wird zufällig bestimmt und nimmt entweder den Wert 5€ oder 10€ an. 
Dazu sind Briefumschläge mit je einem dieser zwei Geldbeträge gefüllt und jedem Gruppen-
mitglied wird durch die Experimentleitung zufällig einer dieser Umschläge zugeteilt. Die 
jeweilige Anzahl der beiden Beträge ist so gewählt, dass genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer zu 
Beginn 5€ bekommen und die anderen 10€.] 
In der zweiten Stufe haben Sie dann unter Umständen die Möglichkeit, das Einkommen von 
einem Ihrer Mitspieler zu reduzieren. Die genauen Details werden Ihnen nach der Ermittlung 
des Starteinkommens mitgeteilt. 
All diese Informationen sind jedem bekannt, diese Anleitung ist für alle Teilnehmer 
identisch… 
Abschließend folgt noch ein Fragebogen und danach wird Ihr Geld ausbezahlt. 
 
Ihr Einkommen beträgt 10€ [5€]                                             Platz-Nr.______ 
 
Wie bereits angekündigt, kann sich nun das Einkommen einzelner Spieler noch verändern. 
Dazu bilden Sie mit einem zufällig ausgewählten Teilnehmer eine 2er Gruppe. Sie können 
dabei entweder einem Spieler zugeordnet sein, der den gleichen Geldbetrag wie Sie erhalten 
hat, oder einem, der den anderen Betrag bekommen hat. Während des gesamten 
Experiments herrscht vollständige Anonymität über die Gruppenzusammensetzung.  
Sie haben nun die Möglichkeit, das Einkommen des anderen Spielers um einen gewissen 
Betrag zu reduzieren. Die Auszahlung des betreffenden Spielers verringert sich dann um den 
angegebenen Wert. (Hinweis: Sie bekommen von diesem Geld nichts selbst hinzu)  
Diese Möglichkeit ist allerdings mit eigenen Kosten in Höhe von 10% des gewählten Betrags 
verbunden. Konkret heißt das, für jeden Euro, den Sie dem anderen Spieler abziehen 
möchten, müssen Sie selbst 0,10€ = 10 Cent bezahlen. Die Höhe der Abzüge ist frei wählbar, 
die maximale Menge ist aber auf den Wert des Starteinkommens des anderen (entweder 5€ 
oder 10€) beschränkt. Sie müssen von dieser Möglichkeit keinen Gebrauch machen. 
Nachdem jeder seine Wahl getroffen hat, wird pro Gruppe einer der beiden Teilnehmer 
ausgelost und dessen Entscheidung wird entsprechend durchgeführt. Das bedeutet, dass 
entweder nur Ihre Entscheidung oder nur die Ihres Spielpartners wirksam wird. Natürlich 
fallen bei Ihnen die Kosten auch nur dann an, wenn Ihre Entscheidung ausgewählt wurde. 
(Aus Gründen der Berechenbarkeit sollte der gewählte Betrag ein Vielfaches von 10 Cent 
betragen). Sie und ihr Spielpartner treffen Ihre Wahl gleichzeitig und völlig unabhängig 
voneinander.  
Tragen Sie jetzt Ihre Entscheidung in den Bogen auf der nächsten Seite ein. Danach werden 
wie angekündigt zufällig die Gruppeneinteilung, sowie die wirksamen Entscheidungen 
ausgelost. Dazu zieht jeder Spieler ein Kärtchen mit einem Buchstaben darauf, der die 
Gruppenzuordnung bestimmt, sowie welche Entscheidung durchgeführt wird.  Tragen Sie 
bitte diesen in das dafür vorgesehene Kästchen auf dem Entscheidungsbogen ein. Stecken 
Sie den Bogen anschließend in den Briefumschlag, den Sie zuvor bekommen haben. Diese 
werden eingesammelt und ausgewertet. Daraus ergeben sich dann die endgültigen 
Auszahlungen für alle Teilnehmer. 
 
Entscheidungsbogen                                                Platz-Nr.______ 
 
 
Ihr Einkommen beträgt 10€ [5€].   
 
Betrag, den Sie dem anderen Spieler abziehen möchten, falls dieser ein                                
Einkommen von 5€ hat: 
 
 
 
Betrag, den Sie dem anderen Spieler abziehen möchten, falls dieser ein                                
Einkommen von 10€ hat: 
 
 
 
Gezogener Buchstabe für die Gruppeneinteilung: 
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Chapter 2
Gender Differences in Bargaining
Experimental evidence†
Abstract We study gender differences and gender pairing effects in a laboratory exper-
iment with alternating-offers bargaining for a fixed pie, framed as an employer-employee
interaction. We vary the degree of asymmetry in bargaining power between roles, as well
as the disclosure of genders of the negotiating partners. This allows us to disentangle
differences based on gender identities and differences due to inherent characteristics, such
as for example risk preferences. With low asymmetry, we find no gender effects in behav-
ior or outcomes. When there is high asymmetry and gender is known, men achieve more
favorable deals than women in both roles, especially in mixed gender pairings. These dif-
ferences are significant, despite gender information being transmitted only in a very subtle
way. However, differences disappear, when no gender information about the bargaining
partner is provided. Additionally, we examine the bargaining strategies of the players in
detail. In presence of high asymmetry, men behave more aggressively in mixed gender
parings, while the opposite effect is true for women. This explains higher earnings for
men conditional on achieving a deal. Our results provide a potential explanation for the
remaining part of the gender wage gap. When we include the cases in which negotiations
fail, the picture is not as clear cut: Men and women achieve similar outcomes on average,
as women are more likely to reach an agreement.
†Joint work with Graciela Kuechle
2. Gender Differences in Bargaining 32
2.1 Introduction and Literature Review
The gender wage gap has been the focus of research in economics for several years. In
the last decades the gap has narrowed considerably in many countries, mostly because
women have acquired higher levels of human capital and spend more years being active
in the labor market (see Blau & Kahn, 2017 for a survey). Nevertheless, the unadjusted
gap still has a value of about 20-25% in Western European countries, depending on how
it is measured (Blau & Kahn, 2017; Boll et al., 2017 ). The unadjusted gap can be split
into an explained and an unexplained part: The explained part consists of factors, which
are directly observable and measurable, such as e.g. education, job experience, work force
interruptions, occupations and industries. The overall reduction of the gap can mostly
be attributed to a reduction of the differences belonging to the explained part. Still,
there remains a small but persistent part of the gap of about 6-12%, which the traditional
factors cannot account for (Boll et al., 2017).
Among others, a prominent explanation for the remaining part are gender differences in
negotiating or bargaining behavior and in the resulting outcomes (Blau & Kahn, 2017).
These differences can stem either from inherent characteristics, such as preferences or from
more external forces based on gender identity, as for example social norms and stereotypes
(Marianne, 2011). Concerning inherent characteristics, there is a lot of evidence in the
literature: Women are found to be more risk averse than men (Eckel & Grossman, 2008b),
women are more likely to avoid competition (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), they are
more concerned with the preferences of other people (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Selten
& Ockenfels, 1998 ) and behave more cooperatively in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
(Eckel & Grossman, 2008a).10 These traits are likely to lead to lower expected payoff
in negotiations. For differences due to norms and stereotypes, evidence is provided for
example by women receiving worse wages offers than men (Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh, 2007) or
being less rewarded for their work, even when delivering the same performance (Heinz et
al., 2016).
10For an additional overview of gender differences in preferences see also Croson and Gneezy (2009) and
for an overview about gender differences in labor markets using evidence from lab and field experiments
see Azmat and Petrongolo (2014).
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As preferences and norms are not directly observable, the literature has shifted the focus
to examining differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes. Since initial wages, pay
raises and promotions are often subject to individual bargaining, negotiation behavior
can possibly explain a substantial part of the remaining gap. In this regard, women have
been found to lag behind men in several ways: Women are less likely to start negotiations
both in the field (Babcock & Laschever, 2009) and in lab experiments (Bowles et al.,
2007; Exley et al., 2016), especially, if wages are not explicitly described as negotiable
(Leibbrandt & List, 2014). Furthermore, women, who start negotiations, are more likely
to be penalized for that decision by male evaluators (Bowles et al., 2007). This expectation
may explain why, according to some studies, women ask for less and are offered less than
men in bargaining settings (Azmat & Petrongolo, 2014; Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh, 2007).
Some of the previous findings point at the constraining effects of gender roles in the context
of negotiation practices, as predicted by social role theories. According to congruity the-
ory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), individuals behave in ways that are consistent with culturally
accepted roles. In Western cultures, women are expected to behave more accommodat-
ing and less aggressive than men, traits that are detrimental to successful bargaining
(Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). In a meta-analysis of
gender differences in bargaining, Mazei et al. (2015) conclude that although men obtain
slightly higher earnings than women, the differences are moderated by various contextual
factors shaped by socially entrenched gender roles (as seen for example in Eagly & Karau,
2002).
Insights on this topic are relevant for real-world applications and institutional designs in
the context of labor markets. There might be efficiency losses, if mutual beneficial deals
are not achieved due to biases in behavior resulting from gender effects. These losses
can go in different directions. Possibly, some profitable contracts are not materialized,
because the offered wage is below the threshold of the negotiating partner. Conversely,
perhaps partners demand substantially higher wages than their reservation values and
end up without an agreement. If differences in outcomes are in a large part the result of
stereotypes and discrimination, one could think of making the application process more
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anonymous (by for example not providing social and demographic information) or, if pos-
sible, base wages to a greater extent on objective criteria, such as individual performance,
instead of bargaining. Another possibility would be to allow for more transparency, by
showing how the amount of wage is determined or making earning ranges for certain
positions publicly known.
Gender differences in experiments where partners fight for a share of financial resources
have been investigated by means of many different designs. The existing literature sug-
gests that gender differences are especially likely to occur, if there is both an asymmetric
situation of power and disclosure of gender information. If one or both of these
factors are missing, then one usually does not observe significant differences.
In symmetric situations, both Lutzker (1961) and Conrath (1972) find no gender differ-
ences in behavior in a Chicken Game independently of whether genders are known to
the partners or not. Also in the studies of Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2018) and
Dittrich et al. (2014), who both employ a bargaining task similar to ours, no differences
are observed when genders are revealed but there is no asymmetry in bargaining power.
These two experiments will be discussed later in more detail.
Studies based on asymmetric situations like the Ultimatum Games provide evidence that
the average offers and acceptance rates of men and women are not significantly different,
if genders are not salient (Eckel & Grossman, 2001; Exley et al., 2016 ; Solnick, 2001).
An exception is Rigdon (2012). In this study, the author finds that women demand
significantly less than men, but when information about other players’ demands and
offers is provided, gender differences vanish completely.
In asymmetric environments where gender is mutual knowledge, results from Ultimatum
Games show that the gender of the proposer affects the acceptance rate, but evidence
is very mixed. While in Eckel and Grossman (2001) women are more likely to accept
offers from other women than from men, in Solnick (2001) this effect goes in the opposite
direction. However, in a recent study of Li et al. (2018), Solnick’s key findings could not
be replicated.
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Concerning experimental evidence from bargaining games, there are two studies based on
Rubinstein (1982) model that bear similarities with ours: Dittrich et al. (2014) conduct
a lab experiment, in which an employer representing a firm and a prospective employee
repeatedly bargain over a wage by means of alternating offers. Each treatment involves
a different minimum wage. The authors find that wages negotiated by women are lower
than those negotiated by men regardless of the employer’s gender. They also provide
evidence of gender pairing effects, in a sense that gender differences in a given role may
depend on the counterpart’s gender. In a recent working paper of Hernandez-Arenaz and
Iriberri (2018), the authors examine gender differences in the presence of different kinds
of asymmetry. They observe significant role differences: Compared to female responders,
male responders are less likely to reach an agreement, spend more time bargaining and
obtain a larger share of the pie conditional on reaching an agreement. But the overall
unconditional earnings of men and women are not significantly different, a result that
holds across treatments and is similar to our findings. In contrast to Dittrich et al.
(2014), Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2018) find no interaction effects, in a sense that
the gender of the bargaining counterpart does not affect the outcomes of the different
genders.
However, none of these studies examine the effect of both influencing factors on gender
pairings systematically, so it is hard to assess their impact in isolation. In this respect,
our paper contributes to the existing literature by varying both factors independently in a
controlled environment. This allows us to examine their effect in isolation and disentangle
possible explanations for differences in bargaining behavior. Furthermore, we consider it
a particular important feature of our design to have a very subtle manipulation for gender
revealing. This information is embedded under the heading of other general demographic
information, which ensures that we do not observe differences that are induced merely by
demand effects.11
Our design is similar to Dittrich et al. (2014), except for the way in which gender in-
formation is transmitted and in the absence of minimum wages. Instead of face to face
11See for example Zizzo (2010) for a survey about this topic.
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interactions, we provide subjects with demographic information of their counterparts that
includes gender and four other items, which are expected to be non-informative12 (age,
place of residence, occupation, and semester). Our design also bears similarities with
Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2018), except for the implementation of different forms of
asymmetry and the disclosure of gender information. In their computer aided experiment,
subjects see on the monitor an avatar, representing their own gender and that of their
bargaining partner. This makes gender very salient in their context and could potentially
create experimenter-demand effects, as it is the only sort of demographic information,
which is provided. A similar argument can be made about the study of Dittrich et al.
(2014), but in face-to-face interactions gender does not necessarily seem to be an explicitly
pronounced factor.
Our results suggest that gender and gender paring effects play an important role in the
bargaining process. We analyze behavior always role-dependently, comparing outcomes
and strategies of female vs. male employers and employees respectively. Overall, we find
no differences in behavior and outcomes in the environment with low asymmetry. We
conjecture that this environment is very close to a symmetric situation, where the 50:50
sharing norm is very salient. Under high asymmetry and if a deal is reached, men are able
to achieve more favorable outcomes than women in both roles. This effect is strongest in
the pairing of a male employer with a female employee, and if genders are known. Under
high asymmetry, if genders are not revealed, men achieve only slightly better outcomes
than women in both roles. The reason behind these differences is that men bargain more
aggressively in mixed gender pairings when genders are revealed, while the opposite is
true for women. If genders are not known, this tendency still remains, but is much less
pronounced. However, if one additionally accounts for the cases, in which the game ends
before a deal has been reached, results are mixed: Men and women perform equally well
on average, as women are more likely to reach a deal, which offsets the differences from
12We asked participants at the end of the experiment, if they took any of the demographic information
into account and if yes, which of those exactly. The item mentioned most frequently was “gender”,
followed by “age”. The other items were not mentioned very often. As age cohorts differed not much
across subjects, one might assume this factor did not play a big role. Further evidence for this claim is
provided in the regression analysis of the results section.
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beforehand. Overall, these results provide further evidence that gender differences mainly
arise, when there is both an asymmetric environment and knowledge about the genders of
the interacting partners. So it seems a certain degree of asymmetry is a necessary, but not
a sufficient condition for gender differences to occur. Probably, in symmetric situations
the fair split is very salient, because of common sharing norms. But given there is some
room left for bargaining, our results suggest that gender differences in behavior depend
both on gender identities and on differences in preferences.
An additional factor, which also might be relevant, is the domain of the negotiation.
Bear and Babcock (2012) show that gender differences disappear, if the very same strate-
gic situation is framed in a “female context” instead of a “male context”. This is also
pointed out in the meta-analysis of Mazei et al. (2015), in which the authors conclude
that “multiple influences may affect role congruity for women in negotiations, so that
gender differences in economic outcomes should depend on the specific context”.13 Due
to practical limitations such as sample sizes, we do not examine this factor further in our
experiment and choose a setting, which is comparable to most preexisting studies.
2.2 Experimental Design
2.2.1 Bargaining Setup
Subjects are matched into groups-of-two and bargain over the division of a pie of 100
experimental units by making alternating offers . Simultaneously to the proposer making
her decision, the responder is asked to state her minimum share, for which she would just
accept the offer. In this respect our design is slightly different to the classical Rubinstein
bargaining game. But this way allows us to elicit more detailed information about the
strategies of the players, compared to just observing, if an offer is accepted or rejected.
To be in line with the strategic framework of the original setup, subjects learn about the
proposal of the previous round, but the minimum is always private information of the
13In most studies as well as in most real world situations, negotiations take place in financial or business
domains. It might well be possible, that women behave much more aggressively, if for example they
bargain about benefits for their children than if they sell their car.
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players. If the share offered to the responder is higher than her stated minimum, the
proposal is automatically implemented and the game ends. As the actual distribution
of shares is not influenced by the reported minimum, this guarantees that there are no
strategic considerations involved and that it is weakly dominant to truthfully state one’s
reservation value. If no agreement is reached, the other subject makes a counteroffer in
the next round. Bargaining continues in this way, until either the parties achieve a deal
or the game ends automatically. From round 3 onwards there is a probability of 20% that
the negotiation will break down, if partners have failed to reach an agreement. If this
happens, a given outside option is implemented. The exact values of the outside option
vary between treatments and reflect the degree of bargaining power of the partners. In
the beginning, subjects are randomly assigned to different roles, named “employer” and
“employee”. The employer is always in a more privileged position, as his outside option
is higher than the one of the employee. Furthermore the employer makes the proposal in
the first and all odd-numbered rounds, which gives him an additional strategic advantage.
in this setting. Our aim was to model an asymmetric environment between negotiation
parties. Firstly, this specification reflects real world (wage) negotiations in a more realistic
way and secondly, as evidence suggests, asymmetry is a necessary condition for gender
differences to occur since there is no clear sharing norm of the pie.
In contrast to similar experiments, the game is played only once, in order to avoid learning
effects or the outcomes of past periods influencing future behavior . Additionally, income
effects or risk preferences might play a role in repeated interactions, depending on the
exact payoff scheme.14 For these reasons the observations of a participant, playing the
same bargaining game several times, cannot be seen as independent. A drawback of
our design is that it yields fewer observations. This reduces the power of the statistical
analyses to some extent, especially if we analyze effects of specific gender pairings.
The whole scenario is framed as a business context. Throughout the description of the
situation, we use terms, which are linked to an employer-employee interaction, in which
partners negotiate about the distribution of the surplus of a (potential) collaboration.
14If for example earnings of different rounds are added up, subjects might become more or less aggressive
in bargaining, depending on whether their earnings are currently above or below their expectations.
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We use this kind of language, as this might make potential effects more pronounced.
Studies have suggested that gender differences in bargaining behavior might be domain-
dependent. Our design allows us to additionally implement a neutral framing15 in order
to test if differences are reduced.
2.2.2 Treatments
The experiment consists of three treatments:
1. Treatment Info & low asymmetry (“Info low”)
2. Treatment Info & high asymmetry (“Info high”)
3. Treatment No info & high asymmetry (“No high”)
All sessions of all treatments follow the same timeline:
1. Demographic questionnaire
2. Instructions for the bargaining task
3. Comprehension quiz (incentivized)
4. Eliciting of expectations
5. Bargaining task (main part)
6. Debriefing questionnaire
In all treatments subjects respond to a demographic questionnaire (age, gender, place
of residence, if they study and if yes, which semester they are enrolled in). In the info
treatments, this information is revealed to the other player for the whole duration of the
negotiation (see figure 2.1).
15One could for example use terms as “Player A” and “Player B” for the roles and avoid calling the game
a “negotiation”.
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Figure 2.1: Screen gender revealing in Info treatments
We chose on purpose a very subtle way of revealing gender in order to avoid potential
experimenter-demand effects, which could arise when providing gender as the only piece
of information. Subjects are informed about this procedure in the instructions for the
bargaining task. In the no info condition, the procedure is exactly the same, except for
the revealing of demographic information. Across all treatments, when the game ends
without reaching an agreement, an asymmetric outside option is implemented. In the
treatment with low asymmetry, the outside option has values of (20, 0), while in the high
asymmetry treatment it is (40, 0). The first number corresponds to the payoff of the
employer and the second to the payoff of the employee respectively. The design allows us
to vary these parameters easily, so one could in future treatments implement a completely
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symmetric situation or an even more asymmetric environment. Before subjects start the
bargaining task, they have to answer some incentivized control questions with immediate
feedback. This was meant to increase the likelihood that subjects understand the rules of
the game.16 We also ask to give their expectations about the outcome of the negotiation.
After the task, subjects complete a debriefing questionnaire, in which, they are asked to
describe their bargaining strategy and offer a self-report on their risk preferences.
2.2.3 Implementation
The experiment was conducted between 08/2017-11/2018 in the experimental lab of the
University of Heidelberg. The bargaining process was implemented using z-Tree exper-
imental software (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 471 subjects, mostly students, took
part.17 The average duration of each session was about 35-40min and average earnings
were 8.52eper subject, with payoffs ranging from 4.00e-14.00e. Further details are sum-
marized in table 2.1 below:
Table 2.1: Sessions overview
Treatment Number of Sessions Number of Subjects
Info low 12 160
Info high 12 159
No high 10 152
The original instructions for each treatment can be found in the Appendix.
2.2.4 Game Theoretic Predictions
In order to be able to assess and compare the degree of asymmetry in bargaining power
across treatments, the payoffs in the resulting sub-game-perfect equilibrium of these games
are derived. Our setup is similar to the classical Rubinstein bargaining model with in-
16The indented effect worked well, as more than 90% of subjects managed to answer at least 6 out of
7 questions correctly. Additionally, all subjects received detailed feedback about the correct answers
before the experiment continued.
17One observation had to be removed, as one participant suddenly became sick and abandoned the
experiment.
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finite time horizon with players having an equal constant discount factor δ. Under the
assumption of risk neutrality, the equilibrium prediction with a shrinking pie according to
a discount factor of δ or a constant continuation probability of p = δ is identical.18 As the
game can end automatically only after finishing the third round, the first two rounds are
irrelevant for the equilibrium prediction. The reason is that in these two initial rounds
there is no discounting of the payoffs and hence neither player would accept any share
below her equilibrium share she would receive in round 3. The bargaining game from
round 3 onwards can be transformed into a game, in which players receive their outside
options.19 as a fixed payoff and bargain about the remaining pie.20 Applied to our con-
text, the game can be transformed to the standard case, in which players bargain over the
remaining pie of (100−x) units and player 1 receives a fixed payoff of x units in addition.
The outcome of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the remaining pie and the equilibrium
proposal in round 1 is ( 1
(1−δ ,
δ
(1−δ)) ∗ Piesize. For the calculation of the final payoffs,
simply the values of the outside option are added. With the parameters implemented in
the experiment this corresponds to the following equilibrium payoffs and equilibrium pro-
posals of the employer (all treatments have the same continuation probability/discount
factor of δ = 0.8):
Table 2.2: Outside options and equilibrium payoffs
Treatment Outside Option Equilibrium Payoffs
Info low (20, 0) (644
9
, 355
9
)
Info high (40, 0) (731
3
, 262
3
)
No high (40, 0) (731
3
, 262
3
)
18If players are risk-averse, then the equilibrium predictions might be slightly different, as a risk-averse
player would prefer a sure payoff of 0.8 times the original pie compared to a lottery, in which he receives
the whole pie with probably 0.8 and a payoff of zero with probability of 0.2.
19This transformation is only correct, if the values of the outside options are not discounted, which is
true in our scenario.
20For further details and a proof for this claim see the working paper of Miller, Montero, and Vanberg
(2015) Their model includes our case as a special case, with the only difference that the role of the
proposer is randomly determined before each round, which does not influence the transformation of the
game.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Outcome Analysis
To analyze the results we will focus on the cases, in which a deal was reached. Firstly,
it makes results comparable to preexisting work, where the main focus is also on gen-
der differences. Secondly, there is no clean comparison for the other cases, because the
outcomes depend additionally on random draws that terminate the game. This could
confound the true effects.21 The last and main reason for this selection is our focus on
explaining potential gender differences in real-world wage negotiations. In this situation
one also observes only the outcomes of the contracts which materialize.
Nevertheless, in order to be able to evaluate the performance of a negotiating strategy,
it is important to also take into account the cases where negotiations failed. We report
and briefly discuss these results in the appendix performing the same analysis (see figures
2.14 and 2.14).
Compared to the game theoretic predictions, subjects are never able to fully exploit their
bargaining power from the employer’s perspective. Maybe, social norms, inequity-aversion
and fairness considerations attenuate given imbalances of bargaining power.
In figures 2.2 and 2.3 average payoffs for women and men are displayed in each treatment.
All significant differences are indicated with arrows and stars.22 We analyze the data
in terms of roles, which means we only compare payoffs of the same role gender-wise
(for example payoffs of female employers with outcomes of male employers). First, we
look at differences within treatments and then we examine differences between treatments
Info high and No Info high to assess, if there is a treatment effect in revealing genders.
Treatment Info low can be seen as a robustness check to confirm, that gender differences
do not arise, when the asymmetry is not high.
21If genders are not equally affected from the random draws terminating the game, payoffs may differ
substantially, despite behavior being identical.
22* indicates significance at the 5 % level and ** at the 1% level.
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Figure 2.2: Mean payoffs of employers
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Considering only cases, when a deal was reached.
Figure 2.3: Mean payoffs of employees
Note: Considering only cases, when a deal was reached.
A Shapiro-Wilk test shows that the data of the payoffs is clearly not normally distributed
(p = 0.000). Therefore we use a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the analysis. In treatment
Info low there are no significant gender differences in either role. A plausible explana-
tion is that subjects often agreed to an approx. 50:50 split. In treatments with a more
asymmetric environment, within treatments men achieve more favorable outcomes than
women across all cases. These differences are only significant within treatment Info high
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for employers (rank-sum test, p = 0.02, see figure 2.2). When comparing average pay-
offs between treatment Info high and treatment No high (figure 2.2), women earn less
as employer, but differences are not significant (rank-sum test, p = 0.18). Looking at
the employee-side, we do not find significant differences in outcomes, neither within nor
between treatments. (see figure 2.3).
The data so far does not yet provide a full picture of the results, as it does not take into
account the gender of the bargaining partner. In the next section we analyze in more
detail gender pairing effects to gain a more in depth understanding of the mechanisms at
play.
2.3.2 Gender Pairing Effects
In figures 2.4 and 2.5 average shares of employers in treatments Info high and No info high
are displayed for each of the four gender-pairings.
Figure 2.4: Mean payoffs in treatment Info high
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Considering only cases, when a deal was reached.
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Figure 2.5: Mean payoffs in treatment No high
Note: Considering only cases, when a deal was reached.
The first attribute refers to the gender of the employer, e.g. in the paring “Female-
Male”, a female employer is interacting with a male employee. We only report employers’-
shares, as when looking at specific gender pairings the shares of the employees’ are exactly
determined and correspond to the residual.23 We perform the analysis from both the
employers’ and the employees’ perspective by comparing a specific gender pairing (for
example “Female-Male”) to the gender parings where either the gender of the employer
(“Male-Male”) or that of the employee (“Female-Female”) is varied.
The results for treatment Info low can be found in the appendix (figure 2.13). Similar
to the previous subsection, in treatment Info low there are no significant differences in
outcomes for any gender pairing. In the second treatment, however, there are clear dif-
ferences in gender pairings (see figure 2.4): Male employers receive a substantially higher
share, when bargaining with a woman, instead of bargaining with a man (rank-sum test,
p = 0.05). Similarly, women earn less than men in the role as employer, when paired with
a female employee. In the latter case, effects are strongest (rank-sum test, p = 0.01), but
in these categories there also exist more observations. The effect seize is about the same
(Cohen′s d = 0.81 and d = 0.84).
23(employee′s share = 100− employer′s share)
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The previous differences for the pairings “Male-Female” and “Male-Male” are not present
in treatment No high (see figure 2.5). Female employers achieve worse outcomes, when
bargaining with male employees. However, the differences remain insignificant (rank-sum
test, p = 0.70). From the analysis of bargaining behavior in section 2.3.4, it will be clear
that the results are driven by male employees, who do not make as many concessions as
female employees do.
2.3.3 Regression Analysis
In this subsection, we report regression analyses that examine gender interaction effects.
This allows us to take several control variables into account.24 Again, we analyze data
role-dependently.
Gender pairing effects are only found in treatment Info high. From the employer’s per-
spective(see table 2.3), males achieve significantly better payoffs than female employers
when facing a female employee (p = 0.01). As the interaction term suggests, this difference
almost completely disappears, when bargaining with a male employee. The interaction
term is not found to be statistically significant, but it is nevertheless in the direction we
expect, given the earlier analysis. Analogously, from the perspective of employees (see
table 2.4), facing a male employer leads females employees to receive significantly worse
payoffs (p < 0.01). This effect disappears if the employee is also male.
In treatments Info low and No high we find no gender or gender pairing effects for either
role. Instead the behavior of subjects is significantly influenced by their expectations
about the outcome of the negotiation and their risk preferences.25 Higher expectations of
employers have a positive influence on payoffs both in treatment Info low and in treat-
ment No high. Players with higher expectations demand higher shares which pays off
on average. More risk-loving employees in treatment No high achieve significantly better
deals. But it is important to note that we focus on the cases, where a deal was reached.
24As control variables we include expectations, risk-preferences, age and the age of the opponent. More
detailed information about how expectations and risk preferences are measured can be found in section
2.3.5 Both age and age of opponent are measured in a scale consisting of five categories. The other
variables, place of residence and occupation, do not have any significant impact; especially as in our
sample the vast majority of subjects have exactly the same characteristics.
25In treatment No high also the age of the opponent has a significant effect, despite being not revealed.
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Table 2.3: Regression: Employer’s share
Info low Info high No high
male=1 -1.443 5.863∗ -1.980
(2.186) (2.281) (2.645)
male opp=1 -1.146 0.480 -2.516
(2.039) (2.716) (2.722)
male=1 X male opp=1 0.683 -5.857 7.286
(3.313) (3.851) (4.406)
expected share 0.339∗∗ -0.127 0.560∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.109) (0.125)
risk loving -0.173 1.071∗ 0.369
(0.379) (0.483) (0.563)
age -1.104 -2.084 -0.240
(0.907) (1.321) (1.195)
age opp 1.081 -1.169 -3.402∗
(0.987) (1.129) (1.404)
Constant 38.33∗∗∗ 67.02∗∗∗ 35.08∗∗∗
(7.247) (8.313) (8.113)
Observations 72 71 65
Standard errors in parentheses
Considering only the cases, in which a deal has been reached
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: Regression: Employee’s share
Info low Info high No high
male=1 0.725 -1.249 0.605
(2.195) (2.700) (3.024)
male opp=1 0.351 -7.022∗∗ -1.614
(2.278) (2.218) (2.791)
male=1 X male opp=1 -0.162 6.897+ -0.386
(3.502) (3.811) (4.896)
expected share -0.0978 0.203∗ 0.180
(0.086) (0.092) (0.122)
risk loving -0.00628 0.374 1.755∗∗
(0.415) (0.391) (0.608)
age -1.807+ 0.568 1.038
(1.010) (1.137) (1.581)
age opp 1.176 1.919 0.792
(0.955) (1.299) (1.279)
Constant 50.69∗∗∗ 25.96∗∗∗ 19.68∗∗
(5.894) (6.514) (7.234)
Observations 72 71 65
Standard errors in parentheses
Considering only the cases, in which a deal has been reached
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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This makes these effects potentially biased, as higher expectations and more risk-loving
behavior are positively correlated with the probability of not reaching an agreement, which
counterweights the previously described effects.
We additionally analyze gender revealing effects using regression analysis contrasting
treatment Info high with treatment No high. This makes it possible to evaluate the effect
of gender revealing on behavior. The regression includes gender pairings and interaction
effects between gender and treatment. The results are presented in table 2.5. Treatment
Info high corresponds to the baseline. There male employers receive higher average pay-
offs than female employers but these differences are not statistically significant. Facing
a male employer significantly decreases a female employee’s share in treatment Info high
(p = 0.01). Both interaction terms “treatment x opponent’s gender” and “gender x op-
ponent’s gender” in the employee’s share regression show that the decrease in payoffs is
reduced in treatment No high and if the employee is male. Again, the interaction terms
are not significant, but they are in the expected direction.
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Table 2.5: Regression: Effects of gender revealing
Employer’s share Employee’s share
male=1 3.623 0.278
(2.306) (2.576)
treatment No high=1 1.276 -1.795
(2.241) (2.175)
male=1 X treatment No high=1 -2.597 -0.289
(2.936) (2.984)
male opp=1 -1.965 -5.483∗
(2.623) (2.221)
male opp=1 X treatment No high=1 1.599 3.003
(3.064) (2.879)
male=1 X male opp=1 -1.698 3.204
(3.073) (3.035)
expected share 0.168+ 0.174∗
(0.087) (0.073)
risk loving 0.719+ 0.935∗∗
(0.392) (0.333)
age -0.958 0.787
(0.935) (0.937)
age opp -1.937∗ 1.116
(0.940) (0.901)
Constant 52.18∗∗∗ 25.63∗∗∗
(6.182) (4.958)
Observations 136 136
Standard errors in parentheses
Comparing only treatments Info high and No high with treatment Info high as baseline.
Considering only the cases, in which a deal has been reached.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.3.4 Analysis of Bargaining Behavior
In this subsection we analyze bargaining strategies employed by the players. Our design
allows us to see how shares demanded by each party evolve per round. In figures 2.6
and 2.7 average demands of employers in the first 3 rounds for different gender pairings
are shown. The abbreviations “F” and “M” stand for “female” and “male”. The same
information is displayed in figures 2.8 and 2.9, for the employee’s perspective. Note, that
employers always make the proposal in the first round (“proposal 1”) and then state their
minimum in the second round (“minimum 2”) etc. For employees this applies analogously
in reversed order. As we did not find significant effects in treatment “Info low”, we only
report bargaining behavior of treatments Info high and No high26.
Figure 2.6: Treatment Info high: Employers’ behavior
In general there is a moderately high path-dependency between proposals per round.27
It is lower in treatment Info high than in treatment No high. Additionally, we find sub-
stantial differences between employers and employees: While the correlation between the
first and second round proposal is very similar for both sides28, the correlation between
26In treatment Info low, average demands for each role are quite close to each other throughout all rounds.
We do not find significant differences in bargaining strategies concerning gender pairings.
27The Pearson correlation coefficient (“PCC”) between proposals of consecutive rounds mostly has values
between 0.50− 0.70.
28The PCC is around 0.60 in each case.
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Figure 2.7: Treatment No high: Employers’ behavior
round 2 and 3 increases for employers and decreases strongly for employees.29 As results
below suggest, this effect is mainly driven by females making bigger concessions between
rounds 2 and 3 when being an employee (see the green and blue lines in figures 2.8 and
2.9).
Figure 2.8: Treatment Info high: Employees’ behavior
29PCC= 0.76 for employers and PCC= 0.41 for employees.
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Figure 2.9: Treatment No high: Employees’ behavior
With respect to gender pairing effects, in treatment Info high we find that as employers
men behave more aggressively, when facing a woman (see the green line in figure 2.6). Men
submit significantly higher proposals in the first round, when interacting with a female
employee, compared to interacting with a male employee (rank-sum test of proposal 1,
p = 0.04). Also in round 2, male employers lower their demands significantly less, when
facing a woman, than female employers do. (rank-sum test of minimum 2, p = 0.05). In
treatment No high these differences disappear (see figure 2.7). Looking at the red line in
figure 2.7 it appears as if in treatment No high female employers ask for smaller shares in
round 2 when facing a male employee, but these differences are not significant.
Focusing on employee behavior, one can see that in treatment Info high (figure 2.8) all
gender pairings start with similar minimums, but especially female employees make bigger
concessions than male employees in subsequent rounds. This leads to significant differ-
ences between the pairing FF and FM round 3 (rank-sum test, p = 0.08). As a substantial
amount of deals already have taken place in the first two rounds, we lack power to ade-
quately analyze if the differences are significant.
In treatment No high, men as employees start with higher demands than women (rank-
sum test of minimum 1, p = 0.07) against female employers (see figure 2.9). As genders
are not revealed in this treatment, one might pool the values for both opponents’ genders.
When doing so, women demand on average slightly less than men do, but significance
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does not change (rank-sum test of minimum 1, p = 0.07).
Overall, when genders are revealed, men employ a more aggressive bargaining strategy.
They demand higher shares in both roles and make smaller concessions in subsequent
rounds. The opposite effect is true for women. This is a likely mechanism to explain, why
men are able to achieve better outcomes in treatment Info high in mixed gender pairings.
2.3.5 Further Analysis
I. When is a deal achieved?
In figure 2.10, the numbers of deals reached within each round are depicted by gender.
Figure 2.10: Fraction of deals reached (all treatments)
Women appear to behave more deal-oriented in both roles and as shown in section 2.3.4
for this purpose they are willing to accept lower shares. As a result, women reach a
deal earlier than men. Frequencies for achieving an agreement in the first round are
significantly different between genders as well as for the cases, when no deal is reached.
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II. Outcome Expectations
In order to better understand bargaining behavior, we asked subjects beforehand, which
share they are expecting to receive.30 In figure 2.11 and 2.12 average expected shares for
both roles are displayed treatment- and gender-wise.
Figure 2.11: Mean expected shares of employers
Figure 2.12: Mean expected shares of employees
30On a scale ranging from 0-100.
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An interesting pattern emerges: Male employers expect higher payoffs than women across
all treatments.31 This exactly reverses for the employee-side. In this role women expect
higher shares across all treatments.32 One possible reason could be that men accept
to a greater extent the strategic aspect of the situation and adjust their expectations
accordingly. Hence, their beliefs are closer to payoffs of the game-theoretic equilibrium,
which are still far more unbalanced. In contrast, women’s expected shares are always
closer to an equal split.
Subjects’ expectations play an important role, as they are strongly correlated to their
first round offers.33 Thus, gender differences in bargaining behavior can to some extent
be explained by gender differences in expectations. Note that subjects at this point in
time are only informed, that demographic information will later be revealed during the
negotiation, but they do not know the exact gender of their opponent yet.
III. Risk-Preferences
A subject’s bargaining strategy can be expected to depend on her risk attitude. Subjects
always face a tradeoff between aiming for a higher share, while accepting a lower probabil-
ity of success or the other way around. More risk-averse subjects would potentially post
lower demands for both roles. The literature suggests that women are more risk-averse
than men, which is confirmed by our data: On a scale ranging from 0-10, women assess
their risk tolerance on average with 4.7 points, while men have an average value of 5.6.
These differences are strongly significant (rank-sum test, p < 0.001). Lower demands
by women can to some extent be explained by differences in risk-attitudes. There exists
a positive correlation between risk-preferences and both the first proposal and the first
minimum34. As this factor clearly plays an important role, we have taken it into account
as a control variable, when analyzing gender pairing effects in outcomes. Still, as we have
seen in treatment Info high the differences in gender parings remain significant, even when
controlling for risk-preferences.
31Differences are significant at the 10%-level in treatments Info low and Info high (two-sided t-test).
32But differences are not significant at treatment level.
33Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.36 for the correlation between expected share and proposal 1, being
highly significant, p < 0.001.
34Spearman’s rho=0.18 and Spearman’s rho=0.22 respectively, p < 0.01 in both cases.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper examines gender differences and gender paring effects in an experimental
bargaining setup. In line with previous findings, we provide further evidence, that a
certain degree of asymmetry concerning bargaining power is a necessary condition for
gender differences to occur. In the symmetric treatment subjects tend to choose an equal
split of the pie. This may be due to participants underestimating the amount of bargaining
power the employer has, as seem from their expectations for this role being clearly lower
than the game theoretic predictions. Alternatively, perhaps they might be influenced by
fairness considerations or social norms and do not try to exploit their bargaining power
to the full extent.35
Under higher asymmetry we find gender differences in behavior and outcomes. Differences
are twofold in nature: On the one hand, we observe gender differences in preferences, which
are of an inherent type. Women are more risk averse and their expectations are closer to
the equal split for both roles. This seems to make them more deal-oriented, as women
have lower demands on average for both roles, even when genders are not revealed.36 This
allows female participants to reach more agreements in total and in earlier rounds. On the
other hand, we provide evidence for gender differences and gender pairings effects due to
gender identity effects. When genders are known, men choose, independently from their
role, a more aggressive bargaining strategy, when facing a female counterpart. This effect
is in line with findings from Dittrich et al. (2014) and Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri
(2018). In contrast, women make more concessions in mixed gender pairings. Taking
these two behavioral patterns together, women achieve worse outcomes, when interacting
with a male participants, when information about genders is provided. It is important to
note, that when examining average payoffs of all pairings while including the cases where
no deal was reached, the male advantage is reduced almost completely. These findings
are also in line with the above mentioned literature.
35Similar to how in Ultimatum games subjects regularly offer an equal split, despite their first mover
advantage.
36See results in treatment No high.
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The results can help to explain part of the gender wage gap that remains after controlling
for known factors such as education, job experience, work force interruptions, occupations
and industries. In real-world wage negotiations, genders are usually known to the inter-
acting partners. As our results suggest, this could have an important effect on earnings,
as in these kind of situations, men achieve significantly better outcomes than women. On
the other hand, if field data is in line with the experimental findings, this would also mean,
that men more often fail to reach an agreement. A phenomenon that is not reflected in
the gender wage gap, as this is only based on observed wages.
We implemented a rather subtle manipulation to inform subjects about the gender of their
bargaining partner. As a next step one could test the effects of revealing gender in a more
salient way, for example, by providing it as the only piece of demographic information.
Another idea for future research would be to further investigate the motivational forces
underlying gender differences in behavior, given they exist. One explanation could be
that differences stem from differences in beliefs about the behavior of the other person.
For example, men might think that women are more easily willing to make concessions
than men and for this reason will demand larger shares, when bargaining with a woman.
Alternatively, differences might result from changes in own behavior by acting according
to socially accepted role models (see e.g. congruity theory by Eagly & Karau, 2002). This
could for example lead women to behave less demanding when they are aware that their
gender is known to the bargaining partner. A possible design for testing both hypotheses
would be to unilaterally reveal gender. This would allow one to distinguish between those
two explanations mentioned before and isolate individual effects.37
37Consider for example the case of a male person A bargaining with a female person B and person A is
unilaterally informed about the gender of person B. If only the first explanation is true, person A will
change his behavior, while B will not. If only the second explanation is true, person B will change her
behavior, while A will not. Accordingly, if both persons change their behavior both factors would seem
to play a role.
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Appendix
A.1 Mean Payoffs Treatment Info low
Figure 2.13: Mean payoffs in treatment Info low
Note: Considering only cases, when a deal was reached
A.2 Mean Payoffs (including cases, when no deal was reached)
In figures 2.14 and 2.15 average outcomes of women and men are displayed for each role
and treatment. In contrast to before, these values also include the cases, when no deal has
been reached and the game was terminated automatically. As before, the only significant
effect is found in treatment Info high. Again, male employers achieve significantly better
outcomes than female employers (rank-sum test, p < 0.01). The remainder provides a
rather mixed picture: The worst outcomes belong to male employees in treatment No high.
They are paying the price for having high demands, that lead to several cases, in which
no deal was achieved.
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Figure 2.14: Mean payoffs of employers
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: Including cases, when no deal was reached
Figure 2.15: Mean payoffs of employees
Note: Including cases, when no deal was reached
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A.3 Instructions (in German)
Experiment - Allgemeine Informationen 
 
Herzlich willkommen zu diesen Experiment und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme! 
Bitte schalten Sie nun Ihr Handy aus und kommunizieren Sie ab jetzt nicht mehr mit den 
anderen Teilnehmern. Wenn Sie eine Frage haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand, wir kommen 
dann zu Ihnen an den Platz und beantworten diese persönlich. 
In diesem Experiment können Sie einen gewissen Geldbetrag verdienen, der Ihnen am Ende 
in bar ausbezahlt wird. Die genaue Höhe dieses Betrags ist abhängig von den von Ihnen 
getroffenen Entscheidungen sowie denen Ihrer Mitspieler. Für Ihre ordnungsgemäße 
Teilnahme erhalten Sie einen Grundbetrag in Höhe von 4€. Zudem bekommen Sie den 
erzielten Betrag aus der nachfolgenden Entscheidungssituation. Und zusätzlich können Sie 
1€ verdienen, falls Sie mindestens sechs der sieben Kontrollfragen richtig beantworten. 
Somit ergibt sich als Gesamtauszahlung für Sie: 
𝑮𝒆𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒕𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒛𝒂𝒉𝒍𝒖𝒏𝒈 = 𝟒€ + (𝟏€) + 𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒈 𝒂𝒖𝒔 𝑬𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒅𝒖𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏  
Ihre Angaben und Entscheidungen während des Experiments werden komplett anonym 
behandelt und können nicht mit Ihrer Person/Identität in Verbindung gebracht werden. 
Der generelle Ablauf des Experiments ist für alle Teilnehmer identisch und wird im 
Folgenden näher beschrieben: 
1) Zuerst füllen Sie einen kurzen Fragebogen mit allgemeinen demografischen Angaben 
aus. 
2) Danach erhalten Sie detaillierte Instruktionen zu der darauffolgenden Entscheidungs-
situation. 
3) Bevor diese durchgeführt wird, beantwortet jeder Teilnehmer ein paar kurze 
Kontrollfragen. 
4) Nun  treffen Sie Ihre Entscheidungen. 
5) Wenn der Prozess beendet ist, erhalten Sie einen weiteren kurzen Fragebogen. 
6) Danach findet die Auszahlung statt. 
 
Anleitung Entscheidungssituation 
 
Im Folgenden bilden Sie und ein anderer Teilnehmer für den Rest des Experiments eine 2er 
Gruppe. Ein Teilnehmer der Gruppe erhält dabei die Rolle „Arbeitgeber“ (AG), der andere 
die Rolle „Arbeitnehmer“ (AN). Die Einteilung der Gruppen und Rollen erfolgte zufällig. 
Ihre zugeteilte Rolle wird Ihnen am Computer angezeigt. 
Beide Partien befinden sich in einer Verhandlungssituation über ein mögliches                                 
Beschäftigungsverhältnis, welches einen Gewinn von 100 Geldeinheiten erzielt, über dessen 
Aufteilung Sie innerhalb Ihrer Gruppe verhandeln können. Dazu werden Sie und Ihr 
Verhandlungspartner pro Runde abwechselnd einen Vorschlag machen, wie die Aufteilung 
der 100 Einheiten erfolgen soll. Der Arbeitgeber ist in der Rolle als "Startspieler" und macht 
den ersten Vorschlag. Sie bzw. der andere Teilnehmer geben währenddessen an, ab 
welchem Minimalanteil Sie den Vorschlag gerade noch akzeptieren würden. Ist der 
angebotene Anteil größer oder gleich diesem Wert, kommt der Vorschlag automatisch 
zustande und die Aufteilung der 100 Einheiten erfolgt gemäß diesem Vorschlag. Falls der 
angebotene Anteil kleiner als Ihr geforderter Minimalanteil ist, wird der Vorschlag abgelehnt 
und es beginnt eine neue Verhandlungsrunde, in der der jeweils andere Teilnehmer an die 
Reihe kommt und einen neuen Aufteilungsvorschlag macht. 
Beispiel 1: Spieler A bietet als Aufteilungsvorschlag an, 60 Geldeinheiten für sich und 40 
Geldeinheiten für Spieler B. Das akzeptierte Minimum von B für diese Runde beträgt 30 Geld-
einheiten. Dieser Vorschlag kommt zustande und die daraus resultierende Aufteilung ist 60 
Geldeinheiten für Spieler A und 40 Geldeinheiten für Spieler B. 
Beispiel 2: Falls das akzeptierte Minimum von B 50 Geldeinheiten (statt wie zuvor 30) 
beträgt, kommt der Vorschlag nicht zustande und es beginnt eine neue Runde, in der Spieler 
B einen Gegenvorschlag macht.  
Dieser Verhandlungsprozess geht dann immer so weiter, bis entweder ein Vorschlag 
angenommen wird oder das Verhandlungsende eintritt. Das Verhandlungsende kann 
frühestens nach Runde 3 eintreten. Falls in Runde 3 oder einer der nachfolgenden Runden 
keine Aufteilung zustande kam, wird jeweils per Zufallsgenerator ermittelt, ob eine weitere 
Verhandlungsrunde durchgeführt wird oder nicht. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass es eine 
weitere Runde gibt, beträgt konstant 80%.                                                                                                     
Der Teilnehmer mit der Rolle „Arbeitgeber“ erhält einen Anteil von 40 [20] Geldeinheiten, 
falls das Verhandlungsende eintritt und zuvor kein Aufteilungsvorschlag angenommen 
wurde, während der Teilnehmer mit der Rolle „Arbeitnehmer“ 0 Geldeinheiten erhält. 
Am Ende des Experiments werden die Geldeinheiten zu einem Kurs von 10:1 in Euro 
umgerechnet, d.h. für je 10 Einheiten erhalten Sie eine Auszahlung von 1€ für diesen Teil. 
Zusätzlich erfahren Sie und Ihr Mitspieler zuvor gegenseitig über sich die zuvor ausgefüllten 
demografischen Angaben wie beispielsweise Alter, Geschlecht, Beschäftigungsstatus… 
[Die zuvor ausgefüllten demografischen Angaben wie beispielsweise Alter, Geschlecht, 
Beschäftigungsstatus…werden den Verhandlungspartnern nicht mitgeteilt.] 
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Chapter 3
Mutual Knowledge of Preferences
Does mutual knowledge of preferences lead to more Nash equi-
librium play? Experimental evidence†
Abstract
In some experiments, Nash equilibrium fails to accurately predict behavior. Usually, it
is assumed that the monetary payoffs in the game represent subjects’ utilities. However,
subjects may actually play a very different game. In this case, mutual knowledge of
preferences may not be satisfied. We run an experiment where we first elicit subjects’
preferences over the monetary payoffs for all players. This allows us to identify equilibria
in the games that subjects actually are playing. We then examine whether revealing other
subjects’ preferences leads to more equilibrium play and find that this information indeed
has a significant effect. Furthermore, it turns out that subjects are more likely to play
maxmin and maxmax strategies than Nash equilibrium strategies. This indicates that
subjects strongly rely on heuristics when selecting a strategy.
†Joint work with Christoph Brunner and T. Florian Kauffeldt
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3.1 Introduction
Applied game theory usually relies on the standard Nash equilibrium (Nash et al., 1950,
Nash, 1951). At the same time, it remains largely unclear whether the underlying (im-
plicit) assumptions are met. For instance, it is often not clear whether there is common
knowledge about payoffs and rationality. In particular, common (or, at least mutual)
knowledge about preferences is a core assumption in game theory. In the words of Polak
(1999):“In games of complete information, common knowledge of payoffs is usually taken
to be implicit. Indeed, this is often taken to be the definition of complete information.”36
Mutual or even common knowledge about preferences is not only assumed in traditional
game theory, but also often in behavioral game theory. In fact, most level-k models as-
sume that payoffs are mutually known and that agents form beliefs about other agents’
play based on this information (see, e.g., Costa-Gomes et al., 2001). Other approaches
such as Quantal Response Equilibrium37 introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) in-
corporate a stochastic element that can be interpreted as uncertainty about other players’
preferences.
Despite the ubiquity of the (implicit) assumption of mutually or commonly known prefer-
ences, there is little empirical evidence about the degree to which it affects the reliability
of the Nash prediction. However, previous experimental research suggests that it should
not be taken for granted. For example, Healy (2011) finds that subjects fail to accurately
predict other subjects’ preferences over possible outcomes in normal-form 2 × 2 games.
The purpose of the experiment reported in this paper is to test whether mutual knowledge
of preferences is important for the Nash prediction in dominance-solvable 2× 2 games.
Our results can be summarized as follows: (1) subjects are indeed significantly more
likely to play a Nash equilibrium strategy when they are informed about their opponents’
preferences over the possible outcomes of the game. When preferences are not mutually
36This means that “complete information” cannot be part of the rules of the game (the game-form)
because it involves assumptions about knowledge of individual preferences. In general, a game with
complete information can be seen as an interactive situation in which both the game-form and players’
preferences are commonly known.
37In Quantal Response Equilibrium, there is an error term in players’ payoff functions whose distribution
is assumed to be known.
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known, the frequency of equilibrium play is rather low.
(2) A strategy is more likely to be played when it cannot lead to the lowest payoffs
(maxmin strategy) or when it can lead to the highest one (maxmax strategy). Furthermore,
maxmin and maxmax strategies predict behavior better than Nash equilibrium strategies,
especially when preferences are not mutually known.
Result (1) shows that subjects not only fail to accurately predict other players’ preferences
as previous evidence already suggests, the lack of such information also significantly affects
their behavior. Whenever it is unlikely that players know each other’s preferences and
some players have no strictly dominant strategy, it might therefore be advisable to use
a more general equilibrium concept. Following Polak (1999), we may view a situation
where preferences are not mutually known as a game with incomplete information. Such
a situation can then be modeled as a Bayesian game (Harsanyi, 1967).38 Result (2)
suggests that subjects largely rely on heuristics rather than on strategic considerations.
The reason may be that subjects do not believe that the other player is rational and/or
are uncertain about his payoff function.
Theoretically, in the tested dominance-solvable 2× 2 games, mutual knowledge of payoff
functions along with mutual knowledge of rationality39 suffices to ensure that agents will
play a Nash equilibrium.40 To see this, suppose one player (called “D”) has a strictly
dominant strategy. Given that D is assumed to know his own payoff function and is
rational, D will play his dominant strategy. The other player (called “ND”) believes that
D is rational and that he has a strictly dominant strategy. Therefore, ND believes that D
will play this strategy. Since ND is himself assumed to be rational and to know his own
payoff function, ND will play a best response to D’s dominant strategy.
38Players with different preferences can be thought of as different types and it is then assumed that the
prior distribution of types is commonly known. This approach has been used in various fields. In
auction theory, for example, the assumption that all bidders are risk neutral and that this is commonly
known has been relaxed. Instead, the prior distribution of risk preferences rather than other bidders’
actual risk preferences are assumed to be commonly known (see, e.g., Hu & Zou, 2015).
39Note that there is a difference between “knowledge” and “(probability one) belief”. Roughly, “knowl-
edge” refers to true belief justified by either direct observation or logical deduction, whereas “belief”
may be false. Therefore, it would be more accurate to assume that players believe that others are
rational with probability one.
40See Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) for sufficient conditions that ensure Nash equilibrium in general
normal-form 2× 2 games.
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Uncertainty about opponent’s rationality and/or payoff function can lead to uncertainty
about the other agents’ strategy choices with unknown probabilities. Uncertainty about
probabilities (ambiguity) can affect peoples’ behavior, as Ellsberg (1961) showed.41 The
strategic ambiguity model of Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) shows that maxmin or maxmax
strategies can be a best response to strategic ambiguity.42
3.1.1 The experiment
In stage 1 of the experiment, we elicit subjects’ preferences over monetary payoff pairs
(they will be referred to as “payment pairs”). The same payment pairs are then used to
construct four different 2×2 games (or more precisely four different game-forms). In stage
2, each subject plays each of these games exactly once. This design allows us to avoid the
assumption that subjects only care about their own monetary payments. Instead, we can
use the preferences elicited in stage 1 to describe the game that our subjects play.43
This will be illustrated with the help of Example 3.1 below, which corresponds to one of
the games played in the experiment.
Example 3.1. Consider the prisoner’s-dilemma-type game-form in Figure 3.1. The num-
bers in the matrix correspond to the amount of money paid to the players, where the first
number is the row player’s payment and the second number is the column player’s payment.
Let r be the row and c be the column player of the game in Example 3.1 and denote the
payment pairs by (xr, xc) ∈ R2. Suppose that both players
41When people face ambiguity, they frequently do not behave as if they were governed by subjective
probabilities.
42This model allows for optimistic responses to strategic ambiguity. Most other strategic ambiguity
models such as those of Lo (1996), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), and Lehrer (2012) assume ambiguity-
averse behavior. While these models can explain maxmin behavior, they cannot rationalize maxmax
behavior.
43We maintain the assumption that preferences depend only on players’ monetary payments. That is,
the specific game-form, other subjects’ preferences, or any other factors have no effect on subjects’
ordinal ranking of payment pairs. Of course, this is to some degree a consequentialist approach and
consequentialism has been criticized in the literature repeatedly. In Section 3.3.4, we will discuss
evidence suggesting that such considerations do not play an important role in the games used in this
study. However, we cannot completely exclude that violations of consequentialism might have caused
some noise and the “true” treatment effect is even higher.
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Figure 3.1: Prisoner’s-dilemma-type game-form
L R
U 4, 4 8, 3
D 3, 8 7, 7
(a) are selfish. That is, each player’s preferences over payment pairs can be represented
by a strictly monotone increasing utility function vi(xi) (i ∈ {r, c}) that depends only
on his own payment or
(b) have other-regarding preferences represented by a function v˜i : R2 → R,
then the games that result in cases (a) and (b) are depicted in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Induced games in Example 3.1
L R
U vr(4), vc(4) vr(8), vc(3)
D vr(3), vc(8) vr(7), vc(7)
(a) Players with selfish preferences
L R
U v˜r(4, 4), v˜c(4, 4) v˜r(8, 3), v˜c(8, 3)
D v˜r(3, 8), v˜c(3, 8) v˜r(7, 7), v˜c(7, 7)
(b) Players with social preferences
The game that results if players are selfish (a) is a prisoner’s-dilemma-type game. For all
strictly monotone increasing utility functions, vi, the game has only one Nash equilibrium
(U,L), i.e., everyone defects. That is not necessarily true for the induced game (b), where
players have social preferences. For example, if v˜r(7, 7) > v˜r(8, 3) and v˜c(7, 7) > v˜c(3, 8),
then mutual cooperation, (D,R), is a Nash equilibrium in (b).
In this paper, whenever we refer to a “Nash equilibrium”, we refer to the Nash equilibrium
of the induced game using the preferences elicited in stage 1 of the experiment. We focus
on those situations, in which a pure unique Nash equilibrium exists (according to the
reported preferences): That corresponds to those cases, in which one player has a strictly
dominant strategy and the other player has a non-dominant unique pure Nash equilibrium
strategy in the induced game.44
44In our experiment, we only ask subjects to rank payment pairs ordinally. Eliciting a cardinal ranking of
payment pairs would require a more complicated procedure that some subjects might fail to understand.
It is not obvious that subjects can reliably assign a cardinal utility to each payment pair. As a result,
we cannot compute Nash equilibria in mixed strategies for the induced games. Moreover, we will
exclude the decisions of subjects who have a strictly or weakly dominant strategy in the induced game.
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Consequently, we consider situations where subjects’ opponents have a strictly dominant
strategy. In the baseline treatment the reported preferences are not revealed. Hence,
subjects cannot be certain that their opponents have a dominant strategy.
For example, suppose the row player in the induced game above (b) is selfish. His pure
strategy U is then strictly dominant. A column player who prefers (4, 4) to (8, 3) and (7, 7)
to (3, 8) then has a unique equilibrium strategy that is not dominant: L. In treatment
baseline, such a column player may not be sure whether row is selfish or not and might
therefore occasionally play R rather than L.
In our second treatment (called “info”), the column player can see that row has a strictly
dominant strategy and might therefore play the unique equilibrium strategy L more often.
Intuitively, this logic can explain our first result that subjects are more likely to play a
Nash equilibrium strategy in treatment info compared to treatment baseline. Further-
more, if a subject is uncertain about the strategy choice of his opponent, then, depending
on his attitude towards uncertainty, he will try to avoid the lowest ranked payment pair
(maxmin), or, to reach the highest ranked one (maxmax). Intuitively, this explains our
second result.
3.1.2 Related literature
The papers closest to ours are Healy (2011) and recent working papers by Wolff (2014)
and Attanasi et al. (2016).
Healy examines whether the sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium identified by
Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) are satisfied when subjects play normal-form 2 × 2
games in the laboratory. For that purpose, subjects first chose a strategy and then state
their beliefs about behavior and preferences of their opponent. Subjects’ own preferences
and rationality are also measured. Healy finds that there are only very few instances where
all conditions are satisfied. Focusing on mutual knowledge of preferences, he finds that
both players correctly predict how their opponent ordinally ranked the payment pairs in
Information about their opponent’s preferences is not necessary for those subjects to compute a best
response and as a result, information about the other player’s preferences should not be expected to
have an effect on behavior.
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only 64% of games played. Healy concludes that “The failure of Nash equilibrium stems
in a large part from the failure of subjects to agree on the game they are playing.”
Since mutual knowledge of preferences is one of three conditions that are together sufficient
for Nash equilibrium in 2× 2 games (see Aumann and Brandenburger, (1995)) and since
the other two are also not fully satisfied in Healy’s experiment, it is difficult to assess the
impact of the failure of mutual knowledge of preferences on equilibrium play in isolation.
By introducing a treatment in which information about the opponent’s preferences is
directly revealed, we can identify the impact of mutual knowledge on equilibrium play by
holding all other factors constant.
Wolff (2014) studies behavior in three-person sequential public good games. In contrast
to our experiment, he does not reveal subjects’ preferences over the material outcomes.
Instead, he elicits subjects’ best-response correspondences to the contributions of the
other players. In one of his treatments, these are then revealed to all group members.
This information has a much smaller effect on the frequency of equilibrium play compared
to the treatment effect in our experiment.
Revealing best-response correspondences is obviously not sufficient for subjects to be able
to predict how much their opponents will contribute: Wolff measures beliefs about others’
contributions to the public good and finds that subjects tend to overestimate these. As a
result, they often fail to play an equilibrium strategy even though their contributions tend
to be consistent with their beliefs and their own reported best-responses. As opposed to
the dominance-solvable 2 × 2 games that we study, several iterations of alternating best
responses are required in Wolff’s experiment to compute the Nash equilibrium. Some
subjects might not be able to do so.
Attanasi et al. (2016) also argue that when subjects have belief-dependent or other-
regarding preferences, they are actually playing a game of incomplete information. In their
experiment, subjects form beliefs about their opponent’s type (e.g., selfish or prosocial)
and choose their strategy based on these belief. Attanasi et al. then test whether revealing
information about opponent’s preferences and beliefs changes behavior in a Mini Trust
Game. They find that first movers are more likely to transfer the money when they face
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a non-selfish trustee (“guilt-averse” trustee) and vice versa. The Mini Trust Game can be
considered as a 2× 2 coordination game with two pure equilibria (trust, share) and (not
trust, not share). Subjects clearly coordinate better on one of these two equilibria when
belief-dependent preferences are disclosed. While this result points in a similar direction
as our results, Attanasi et al. do not systematically test the impact of mutual knowledge
of preferences on the Nash prediction. In particular, the second movers can observe the
decisions of the first movers. Therefore, the preferences of the first movers are not relevant
for their strategy choices.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the experimental design. We
then present our results, and conclude in Section 3.4. The appendix provides additional
information about the experiment.
3.2 Experimental design
Our experiment consists of two treatments (called “baseline” and “info”) with two stages
each. In the first stage of both treatments, we elicit subjects’ preferences over eight
different payment pairs. These payment pairs are then used to construct four different
2× 2 games. In stage 2 of each treatment, subjects play each one of these games exactly
once. In treatment “info”, subjects can see their opponent’s ordinal ranking of the four
payment pairs used in the current game, whereas in treatment “baseline”, this information
is not disclosed.
3.2.1 Stage 1 of the experiment
Stage 1 is identical in both treatments. Subjects are asked to create an ordinal ranking
over the following set Xrow of eight payment pairs (xr, xc):
Xrow = {(8, 3), (7, 7), (5, 8), (4, 4), (6, 2), (3, 8), (3, 3), (2, 2)} ⊂ R2 (3.1)
The first number, xr, corresponds to the amount of money (in Euros) paid to the decision-
maker in the role of a row player. The second number, xc, is paid to some other subject
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in the role of a column player (the “recipient”).45 Subjects are informed that they will
not interact with the recipient in any other way in either stage of the experiment.
The order in which the payment pairs appear on the screen was randomly determined
beforehand and remains constant in all sessions. Subjects rank the payment pairs by
assigning a number between one and eight to each pair, where lower numbers indicate
a higher preference. The same number can be assigned to multiple payment pairs, thus
allowing for indifference.
In treatment info, subjects are told that their rankings would be disclosed to other
participants at a later stage of the experiment.46 In treatment baseline, we made it clear
that this information would not be revealed. We will explain at the end of this section
how the elicitation of preferences was incentivized. After subjects confirm their ranking,
they proceed to stage 2, in which they play four one-shot 2 × 2 games. We ran two
waves of experiments. In the first wave, subjects played the games in Figure 3.3 (all
numbers are payments in Euro). In the second wave, they played the games in Figure 3.4.
3.2.2 Stage 2 of the experiment
Figure 3.3: Games in wave 1 of the experiment
Game 1
L R
U 4, 4 8, 3
D 3, 8 7, 7
Game 2
L R
U 5, 8 7, 7
D 6, 2 3, 3
Game 3
L R
U 4, 4 8, 3
D 3, 3 7, 7
Game 4
L R
U 8, 3 2, 2
D 7, 7 3, 8
45Subjects who were assigned the role of a column player ranked the same payment pairs but the first
number corresponds to the other player’s payoff. Rewriting Xrow for column players such that the first
number corresponds to the column player’s payment and the second to the row player’s, we obtain
Xcolumn = {(8, 3), (7, 7), (8, 5), (4, 4), (2, 6), (3, 8), (3, 3), (2, 2)} ⊂ R2.
46We will discuss the possibility that subjects might strategically misrepresent their preferences in the
results section.
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Figure 3.4: Games in wave 2 of the experiment
Game 5
L R
U 3, 8 8, 3
D 3, 3 7, 7
Game 6
L R
U 8, 3 2, 2
D 2, 2 3, 8
Game 7
L R
U 8, 3 6, 2
D 7, 7 5, 8
Game 8
L R
U 3, 3 8, 3
D 2, 2 7, 7
As described in the introduction, only one type of strategic situation is of interest (regard-
less of the monetary payoffs): a unique pure Nash equilibrium in the induced game where
one player has a unique equilibrium strategy that is neither weakly nor strictly dominant.
This is only possible when the other player has a strictly dominant strategy. Therefore,
games in which one and only one player has a strictly dominant strategy are most useful
to testing whether mutual knowledge of preferences increases equilibrium play and some
of the games were selected accordingly. All games were constructed using the same eight
payment pairs. Furthermore, as described below, we made sure that the games exhibit
some diversity with respect to the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria under the
assumption that subjects are selfish payment maximizers.
The 8 games were selected on the basis of 2 key criteria that seem to play an important
role in the context of our study:
(i) # players, who have a strictly dominant strategy (0, 1 or 2) and
(ii) # pure Nash equilibria (0, 1 or 2).
Both criteria were determined for the case where preferences correspond to monetary
payoffs (i.e., on the basis of the game-forms). 2×2 games can be grouped into 6 categories
based on these two criteria (some combinations are not possible, e.g., 2 players with strictly
dominant strategies and 2 Nash equilibria). Games with more than 2 pure equilibria
are unlikely to offer valuable insights for our analysis because they are not expected
to generate many relevant observations. We first run wave 1 of the experiment, then
we selected the games of wave 2 so that we have at least one game of each of the 6
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categories. Furthermore, we wanted to cover most of the 2× 2 games that are frequently
used in experimental economics (e.g., Prisoners’ Dilemma, Matching Pennies, and Battle
of Sexes).
In both treatments, subjects can see how they ranked the four payment pairs of the cur-
rently played game. This information is displayed by assigning 1-4 stars to each outcome,
where more stars indicate a better outcome. In treatment info, subjects are shown both
their own and their opponent’s ranking in matrix-form (see Figure 3.5). Just like in the
payment matrix, the first entry corresponds to the subject’s own ranking while the second
entry reveals the opponent’s ranking. In treatment baseline, subjects are shown the same
rankings matrix but this matrix only contains their own rankings.
Figure 3.5: Information screen
All subjects play each of the four games of their wave exactly once, each time against a
different anonymous opponent. Games are played one after another and feedback about
the outcome is only provided at the end of the experiment when subjects are paid, but
not while subjects still make decisions.
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In both treatments, each subject is paid for exactly one of his decisions, which is randomly
selected at the end of the experiment. If a decision from stage 1 is chosen, two of the
eight payment pairs from the set Xrow are randomly selected. The row subject is then
paid the first number, xr, of the payment pair that he ranked more highly in stage 1. The
second number, xc, is paid to some other column subject. In order to avoid reciprocity
considerations, we made it clear that the second number is paid to a subject with whom
subjects will not interact in the second stage of the experiment. Column subjects are paid
in a similar manner.
The probability that stage 1 is paid is 7
8
while stage 2 is paid with a probability of 1
8
. These
probabilities are consistent with selecting each of the
(
8
2
)
possible pairs of payment pairs
and each of the four decisions made in stage 2 with equal probability. Paying stage 1 with
a substantially higher probability also reduces the odds that subjects might misrepresent
their preferences. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.4.
Subjects were given printed instructions and they could only participate after successfully
answering several test questions. Test questions as well as the rest of the experiment
were programmed using Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All sessions of the experiment were
conducted at the AWI-Lab of the University of Heidelberg. Subjects from all fields of
study were recruited using Orsee (Greiner, 2015). Fewer than half of the subjects were
economics students. Sessions lasted about 40-50 minutes on average. The following table
summarizes the number of participants per session as well as average payments:
Table 3.1: Summary of treatment information
Treatment Wave Sessions Subjects Average payment
baseline 1 9 97 e 12.02
baseline 2 7 91 e 10.54
info 1 8 95 e 11.78
info 2 7 85 e 11.41
Decisions made by subjects who made more than 10 mistakes when answering test ques-
tions are excluded from the data (including Table 3.1).47
47The main treatment effect (Table 3.6) is still significant when these 10 subjects are included. In
treatment baseline, 2 subjects made more than 10 mistakes, in treatment info, there were 8 such
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3.3 Results
In this section, we first characterize subjects’ preferences as measured in stage 1 of the
experiment. We then present the main treatment effect: subjects are significantly
more likely to play their unique equilibrium strategy in treatment info than
in treatment baseline. This effect can be observed in 6 of the 8 games. Subsequently,
we show that maxmin and maxmax strategies are more likely to be played in
both treatments. We argue that it is unlikely that subjects misrepresent their true
preferences or that many preferences changed when subjects are shown their opponents’
preferences.
3.3.1 Characterization of measured preferences
In stage 1 of the experiment, we elicit subjects’ preferences over the payment pairs
(xr, xc) ∈ Xrow defined in equation (3.1). Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the ordinal rank-
ings reported by at least two subjects who were assigned the role of a row and column
player respectively. Payment pairs that are assigned a lower number are preferred to
payment pairs with a higher number.
subjects. It is not plausible that the decisions of the excluded subjects affected other subjects’ decisions
since all of our games are simultaneous games and subjects were not informed about the decisions of
their opponents during the experiment.
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Table 3.2: Preferences reported by at least two subjects who were assigned the role of a row player,
both treatments. Smaller numbers are assigned to better ranked payment pairs.
(8,3) (7,7) (5,8) (4,4) (6,2) (3,8) (3,3) (2,2) n
1 2 4 5 3 6 7 8 63
1 2 4 5 3 7 6 8 15
2 1 4 5 3 6 7 8 15
1 2 4 5 3 6 6 8 12
2 1 3 5 4 6 7 8 10
2 1 3 6 4 5 7 8 7
1 2 3 5 4 6 7 8 5
2 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 5
3 1 2 5 6 4 7 8 3
3 1 2 5 5 3 7 8 3
1 2 3 5 3 6 7 8 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2
3 1 2 6 5 4 7 8 2
3 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 2
1 1 4 5 3 6 7 8 2
1 2 5 4 3 7 6 8 2
1 2 4 6 3 5 7 8 2
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Table 3.3: Preferences reported by at least two subjects who were assigned the role of a column
player, both treatments. Smaller numbers are assigned to better ranked payment pairs.
(8,3) (7,7) (8,5) (4,4) (2,6) (3,8) (3,3) (2,2) n
2 3 1 4 7 5 6 8 68
3 2 1 4 7 5 6 8 14
3 1 2 4 7 5 6 8 14
3 1 2 5 6 4 7 8 8
1 3 1 4 7 5 5 7 5
3 1 2 4 8 6 5 7 5
1 3 1 4 8 6 5 7 4
3 2 1 5 7 4 6 8 4
2 3 1 4 7 5 5 7 4
3 2 1 5 6 4 7 8 3
1 3 1 4 7 5 6 8 3
4 1 2 3 6 5 7 8 2
1 3 2 4 8 6 5 7 2
3 1 2 4 6 5 7 8 2
2 3 1 4 6 5 7 8 2
3 2 1 4 8 6 5 7 2
3 1 2 4 8 7 5 6 2
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To characterize subjects’ preferences, we introduce four properties: pareto-efficiency, strict
pareto efficiency, maximization of own payoff, and maximization of total payoff. These
properties are defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Pareto efficiency). A subject’s preferences % on X are said to satisfy
pareto-efficiency if, for all x, y ∈ Xrow, x  y whenever xr ≥ yr and xc ≥ yc with at least
one inequality strict.
Definition 2 (Strict pareto efficiency). A subject’s preferences % on X are said to satisfy
strict pareto-efficiency if, for all x, y ∈ Xrow, x  y whenever xr > yr and xc > yc.
Definition 3 (Own payoff maximization). A row (column) subject is said to maximize
his own payoff if, for all x, y ∈ Xrow (x, y ∈ Xcolumn), x  y whenever xr > yr (xc > yc).
Definition 4 (Total payoff maximization). A subject is said to maximize total payoff if,
for all x, y ∈ Xrow, x  y whenever xr + xc > yr + yc.
Table 3.4 shows the fraction of subjects whose preferences are consistent with the pro-
perties defined above.
Table 3.4: Measured preferences
Treatment Pareto
efficiency
Strict pareto
efficiency
Own payoff
max.
Total payoff
max.
n
Pooled 70.9% 90.2% 48.6% 4.6% 368
Baseline 71.8% 90.4% 46.8% 4.3% 188
Info 70.0% 90.0% 50.6% 5.0% 180
Preferences that satisfy pareto efficiency or own payoff maximization must also satisfy
strict pareto efficiency. The vast majority of subjects report preferences that are consistent
with strict pareto efficiency. Table 3.5 further classifies those preferences. Clearly, most
preferences that satisfy strict pareto efficiency also satisfy either pareto efficiency or own
payoff maximization or both. Only 6.9% of the preferences that satisfy strict pareto
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efficiency are not consistent with either pareto efficiency or own payoff maximization
(pooled data). Notice also that preferences that satisfy total payoff maximization must
simultaneously satisfy pareto efficiency.
Table 3.5: Preferences that satisfy strict pareto efficiency
Treatment Pareto Own payoff
max.
Pareto and
Own payoff
max
Only strict
pareto
n
Pooled 78.6% 53.9% 39.5% 6.9% 332
Baseline 79.4% 51.8% 37.6% 6.5% 170
Info 77.8% 56.2% 41.4% 7.4% 162
3.3.2 Nash equilibrium play
Our first hypothesis is that subject behavior is more consistent with the Nash equilibrium
when preferences are mutually known. As outlined in the introduction, playing a maxmin
or a maxmax strategy can be a response to strategic uncertainty. Therefore, our second
hypothesis is that a strategy is more likely to be played when it is a maxmin and/or a
maxmax strategy.
We test the first hypothesis by using two different subsets of our data. Recall that each
subject played four games. Since there are a total of 368 subjects who participated in
the experiment, we have data on 1472 individual decisions, 752 in treatment baseline
and 720 in treatment info. As described earlier, we focus on situations in which one
player has a unique pure non-dominant equilibrium strategy. Therefore, we exclude those
decisions where both strategies are played with strictly positive probability in some Nash
equilibrium, which leaves us with 862 decisions (424 in treatment baseline and 438 in
treatment info). We also exclude those decisions where the equilibrium strategy is weakly
or strictly dominant. In such a situation, the best response does not depend on the other
player’s strategy and therefore, it should not matter whether or not the other players’
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preferences are known. This leaves us with 279 individual decisions, 140 in treatment
baseline and 139 in treatment info.
In all of these 279 games, the subject whose decision we study has a unique pure equilib-
rium strategy and that subject’s opponent has a strictly dominant strategy. We test our
main hypothesis using these 279 observations and will refer to the corresponding subset
of our data as “all subjects”. Figure 3.6 shows that subjects play an equilibrium strategy
more often in treatment info than in treatment baseline.
Figure 3.6: Frequencies of played unique equilibrium strategies
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
All subjects Consistent subjects only
Baseline Info
To test whether these differences are significant, we run a logit regression. The depen-
dent variable “equilibrium strategy played” assumes a value of 1 if a subject plays the
unique equilibrium strategy and 0 otherwise. We include an intercept as well as a dummy
variable, which assumes a value of 1 if the observation is generated in treatment info and
0 otherwise. These results are shown in Table 3.6. The treatment effect is significant
indicating that informing subjects about their opponents’ preferences leads to a higher
frequency of equilibrium play.
We run the same test a second time with a smaller subset of our data which no longer
includes the decisions made by subjects who played a strictly dominated strategy in at
least one of the four games. Either the preferences that these subjects reported in stage
1 do not reflect their true preferences or they are not rational in the sense that their
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choice in stage 2 is inconsistent with their reported preferences. Table 3.7 shows that
approximately one fourth of our subjects violate strict dominance at least once.
Table 3.6: Logit regression “equilibrium strategy played”, robust standard errors clustered by
subject
Dependent variable: All Subjects Consistent subjects only
equilibrium strategy played
info 0.54∗∗ 0.60∗∗
(0.26) (0.29)
constant -0.41∗∗ -0.41∗∗
(0.18) (0.20)
n 279 226
Clusters 212 166
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.016
∗∗ significant at 5% level
Table 3.7: Violations of strict dominance
Treatment Subjects Games
played
Games
with dom-
inant
strategy
Dominated
strategy
played
Subjects
who played
dominated
strategy at
least once
Baseline 188 752 280 23.2% 26.1%
Info 180 720 295 24.4% 29.4%
Similar to the subset “all subjects” we also only use games where the subject has a unique
equilibrium strategy that is not dominant. Removing the choices made by inconsistent
subjects therefore further reduces the number of observations to 226 individual decisions,
115 in treatment baseline and 111 in treatment info. We will refer to this subset of our
data as “consistent subjects only”. The treatment effect is comparable when we only use
the decisions made by these consistent subjects, even though the number of observations
is reduced by approximately 20%.
We also test whether there is a significant treatment effect using a two-tailed two-sample
Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The dependent variable is the frequency with which a subject
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played an equilibrium strategy. Each subject who plays at least one game where the
subject has a unique equilibrium strategy that is not weakly or strictly dominant counts
as one observation. We run the same test for all subjects and for consistent subjects only.
When using all (only consistent) subjects, we have 107 (87) observations in treatment
baseline and 105 (79) in treatment info. The null hypothesis that the distribution of the
frequency of equilibrium play is the same in both treatments can be rejected regardless
of which data set we use.48
Result 1: Subjects are more likely to play their unique Nash equilibrium strategy when
preferences are mutually known.
As a robustness check, we also compute the frequency of equilibrium play for each game
separately. These results are shown in Figure 3.7 for all subjects and in Figure 3.8 for
consistent subjects only. Regardless of which subset of our data we use, the frequency of
equilibrium play is higher in treatment info than in treatment baseline for every game49
except for games 5 and 6.
At first glance, subject behavior in Game 5 appears to be surprising: there is less equilib-
rium play in treatment info than in treatment baseline. A detailed check shows that all
subjects, who did not take the equilibrium stategy in treatment info, were column players
who played strategy R. The row players had the strictly dominant strategy U . Our sec-
ond main result in Section 3.3.3 shows that many subjects followed a heuristic approach
by selecting maxmax and/or maxmin strategies. Game 5 exhibits a special feature: the
equilibrium and maxmax/maxmin strategy especially often fall apart. In several cases the
(non-equlibrium) strategy R is both the maxmax and the maxmin strategy. These cases
occur considerably more often in treatment info than in treatment baseline: in treatment
info, 6 out of 10 subjects who violated the equilibrium prediction faced such a situation,
while this is only the case for 1 out of 3 subjects in treatment baseline.
48p = 0.083 using all subjects, p = 0.086 using consistent subjects only.
49Using a Fisher exact test, this difference is significant at the 5% level for Game 3, when we use all
subjects. We have more observations for Game 3 than for any other game. In Game 3, it occurred
particularly often that one subject had a strictly dominant equilibrium strategy while the other subject
did not have a strictly or weakly dominant strategy. Details of these tests can be found in the appendix
(tables 3.10 and 3.11).
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In Game 6 the frequency of equilibrium play is zero in both treatments as Figure 3.7
shows. This is in line with what we have expected: recall that Game 6 is a “Battle of
Sexes”-type game-form and we expected that the game that subjects actually play (the
induced game) is in most cases a “Battle of Sexes”-type game. Consequently, the situa-
tion that one subject has a unique non-dominant equilibrium strategy occurs very rarely
here (for consistent subjects, we only have 5 relevant cases in both treatments together).
Nonetheless, it makes sense to incorporate this situation in our analysis. First, we intend
to provide a comprehensive analysis of the most popular games used in the experimen-
tal literature as described in the introduction. Second, we wanted to test whether the
outcome meets our expectations.
Figure 3.7: Frequency of equilibrium play by game, all subjects
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Figure 3.8: Frequency of equilibrium play by game, consistent subjects only
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3.3.3 Maxmin and maxmax strategy play
In the following, we discuss our second hypothesis that maxmin and maxmax strategies are
more likely to be played. Subjects may use these strategies when they are uncertain about
other players’ payoff functions and/or other players’ rationality. In treatment baseline,
subjects face both types of uncertainty, whereas the uncertainty about other players’
payoffs is removed in treatment info. Since there is some uncertainty in both treatments,
we would expect a strategy to be played more often if it is a maxmin or a maxmax
strategy in both treatments. Both effects are expected to be stronger in treatment baseline
compared to treatment info.
We test these conjectures by running a conditional logit regression. An observation cor-
responds to a pure strategy. The dependent variable (“played”) assumes a value of 1 if a
strategy is played and 0 otherwise. Three independent variables are used to characterize
each strategy: “equilibrium” indicates whether a strategy is a Nash equilibrium strategy.
“maxmax” assumes a value of 1 if a strategy can lead to a most highly ranked payment
pair. “maxmin” indicates whether a strategy can result in the realization of a lowest
ranked payment pair (maxmin = 0 if that is the case, maxmin = 1 otherwise).
We only use decisions made by subjects who never played a strictly dominated stra-
tegy. Table 3.8 shows that whether or not a strategy is a Nash equilibrium strategy
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only matters in treatment info when predicting which strategies subjects will play.
In contrast, the coefficients of maxmax and maxmin are highly significant in both
treatments. While the three independent variables (“equilibrium”, “maxmax” and
“maxmin”) are correlated, all pairwise correlation coefficients are lower than 0.5. Further
details on the relationship of the three independent variables can be found in the appendix.
Table 3.8: Conditional logit regression “played”, robust standard errors clustered by subject
Dependent variable: Baseline Info
played
equilibrium 0.09 0.89∗∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.22)
maxmax 1.61∗∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.15)
maxmin 1.39∗∗∗∗ 1.29 ∗∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.15)
n 1112 1016
Clusters 139 127
Pseudo R2 0.40 0.41
∗∗∗∗ significant at 0.1% level
Result 2: In both treatments, a strategy is more likely to be played when it cannot lead to
the lowest ranked payment pair and when it can lead to the highest ranked payment pair.
In line with Result 1, the coefficient estimate for the variable “equilibrium” differs sig-
nificantly among the two treatments and is only useful to predict play in treatment info
but not in treatment baseline. In contrast, the highest and lowest ranked payment pair
seems to attract our subjects’ attention in both treatments. As expected, the according
coefficient estimates are higher in treatment baseline than in treatment info. However,
the difference is not signficant.50
50The coefficient estimate of an interaction term of maxmin and the treatment dummy (maxmax and the
treatment dummy) is not significant.
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3.3.4 Did we manage to elicit subjects’ true preferences?
When preferences are elicited in stage 1 of the experiment, subjects in treatment info
are aware that these preferences will be revealed to other subjects. However, they are
not informed about the specific games that are played in stage 2. Hence, subjects did
not have the information necessary to figure out what kind of misrepresentation might be
most advantageous: in some 2× 2 games, it could be beneficial to be perceived as having
social preferences whereas in other games, the contrary is more likely (e.g., in the chicken
game). Moreover, recall that a decision made in stage 2 affects a subject’s payment with
a probability of only 1/8. All in all, in treatment baseline, subjects had clear and strong
incentives to truthfully report their preferences. It was clear to subjects that their reports
would not be revealed to anyone but the experimenter. Therefore, it is not plausible that
a rational subject would misrepresent his preferences.
We test the claim that subjects truthfully reported their preferences in stage 1 of treatment
info by using the frequency with which subjects play strictly dominated strategies in
stage 2 of the experiment. To identify strategies that are strictly dominated, we use the
preferences elicited in stage 1. If these reflect a subject’s true preferences, a rational
subject should never play such a strictly dominated strategy. In contrast, if subjects
strategically misrepresent their preferences in stage 1, a strategy that we classify as strictly
dominated may in fact not be dominated according to the subjects’ true preferences.
Since preferences in treatment baseline are not revealed to other subjects, it is clear that
subjects in treatment baseline have no reason to misrepresent their preferences. Therefore,
we can compare the frequency with which subjects play a strictly dominated strategy in
the two treatments to test the claim that preferences are truthfully revealed in stage 1
of treatment info. If that claim is true, no difference should be observed. Otherwise,
subjects should be more likely to play a strictly dominated strategy in treatment info
than in baseline.
Table 3.7 shows how often subjects play a strictly dominated strategy using the preferences
reported in stage 1 to define the according games. Each subject played 4 games, thus
resulting in 752 games played in treatment baseline and 720 in info. In 280 of these games
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in treatment baseline and 295 in info, one of the strategies was strictly dominated. In
roughly a quarter of these cases, the strictly dominated strategy was played.
In order to check the assumption that subjects do not misrepresent their preferences in
both treatments, we run a logit regression using the 280 games in treatment baseline
as well as the 295 games in treatment info as observations. The dependent variable
“dominated strategy played” is a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 if the strictly
dominated strategy was played. The only explanatory variable other than the intercept
is a treatment dummy (“info”) (see Table 3.9).
Table 3.9: Logit regression “dominated strategy played”, robust standard errors clustered by sub-
ject
Dependent variable: dominated strategy played
Info 0.07
(0.23)
Constant -1.20∗∗∗
(0.16)
n 575
Clusters 333
Pseudo R2 0.0002
∗∗∗significant at 1% level
The coefficient estimate for the treatment dummy is not significantly different from 0.
Hence, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. We also test the same assumption using
a two-tailed two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The dependent variable is then the fre-
quency with which a subject plays a dominated strategy. Each subject who had a strictly
dominant strategy in at least one of the four games corresponds to an observation. There
are 165 such observations in treatment baseline and 168 in treatment info. We cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the frequency with which strictly dominated strategies are
played follows the same distribution in the two treatments (p = 0.81).
Result 3: Subjects are equally likely to play a strictly dominated strategy in both treat-
ments.
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Moreover, the fraction of subjects whose reported preferences are consistent with own
payoff maximization is even slightly larger in treatment info compared to treatment base-
line, though the difference is not significant (p = 0.53 using a Fisher exact test). All other
properties of measured preferences that we discussed in section 3.3.1 are also satisfied
equally frequently in both treatments (see tables 3.4 and 3.5). We therefore maintain the
assumption that subjects truthfully report their preferences in stage 1 of the experiment
in both treatments.
In psychological game theory, Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) in-
troduced models of reciprocity in which players reward kind actions and punish unkind
ones. Reciprocity could lead to a problem equivalent to the misrepresentation of prefer-
ences discussed in this section. For instance, consider Game 1 in stage 2 of treatment
info. Suppose an own-payoff maximizer (row) is matched with a total-payoff maximizer
(column). The row player might then believe that column will cooperate (play R), even
though column expects row to defect (play U). This expected kindness on the part of
column might then induce row to also cooperate, thus violating our assumption that only
outcomes matter. In other words, subjects’ preferences might change once they are shown
their opponents’ ranking of payment pairs in stage 2 of treatment info. Another poten-
tial violation of our assumption might arise if subjects’ preferences over payment pairs
changed once they are shown the specific game-form.
If there were many preference reversals of the reciprocity type, we would expect to observe
some differences between treatment info and baseline since subjects’ preferences are only
revealed in treatment info. In fact, we found no evidence that would support this claim.
For instance, Result 3 indicates that there is no significant difference concerning the play
of strictly dominated strategies. This indicates that reciprocity effects probably do not
matter much in our experiment. If they did, one would expect to observe that subjects
play strictly dominated strategies more often in treatment info compared to treatment
baseline (e.g., because some subjects, who reported selfish preferences, would reward
opponents with social preferences). We cannot exclude that there were some preference
reversals arising from the strategic situation in stage 2 (as compared to the ranking of
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payment pairs in stage 1). However, since there is a treatment effect, this would be only
a problem if such preference reversals led to a systematic upward bias (indicating a false-
positive result). We checked our data and found no evidence indicating such a bias. This
is plausible since subjects face the same game-forms in both treatments. Hence, it is
unlikely that there were very different preference reversals in the treatments that caused
an upward bias. After all, we found a significant treatment effect despite many factors
that potentially caused noise in the experiment. In our view, this makes our result more
robust and indicates that the “true” treatment effect might be even stronger.
3.4 Conclusion
The assumption that players’ preferences are mutually known is often not satisfied in the
laboratory. It seems plausible that similar difficulties exist in many real-world situations as
well. Our experiment shows that it is a relevant assumption: making sure that preferences
are mutually known leads to significantly more equilibrium play.
When deciding what model to apply to a specific situation, whether or not agents can
reasonably be expected to know other agents’ payoff functions should therefore play an
important role. At least in the games we analyzed, subjects are unlikely to play a Nash
equilibrium strategy when payoff functions are not mutually known. Many other models
that are used in behavioral game theory (e.g., level-k models) also rely on the assumption
of mutual knowledge of preferences. These models might also fail to accurately predict
behavior whenever preferences are not mutually known.
Our results also show that subjects are more likely to play maxmin or maxmax strategies
rather than the Nash equilibrium strategy. Hence, many subjects seem to rely on heuristics
rather than on strategic considerations when selecting a strategy.
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Appendix
A.1 Details of the robustness check tests for the main result
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 report the results of a two-tailed Fisher exact test of the null
hypothesis that the probability that a subject plays the equilibrium strategy is the same
in both treatments. These tests were run separately for each of the 4 games. n base is the
number of observations in treatment baseline and n info the number of observations in
treatment info. The tests reported in Table 3.10 include all subjects while those reported
in Table 3.11 include consistent subjects only.
Table 3.10: Fisher exact test (two-tailed), all subjects.
Game n base n info p-value
1 22 15 0.193
2 11 17 1.000
3 30 32 0.028
4 18 17 0.176
5 17 20 0.082
6 4 3 n.A.
7 22 21 0.364
8 16 14 0.484
Table 3.11: Fisher exact test (two-tailed), consistent subjects only.
Game n base n info p-value
1 17 11 0.121
2 7 13 0.374
3 23 25 0.075
4 10 10 0.170
5 17 18 0.075
6 3 2 n.A.
7 22 21 0.364
8 16 11 0.696
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A.2 Details on the conditional logit regression (table 8)
Table 3.12 provides additional information for both regressions that are displayed in table
3.8: We check for each pure strategy available to consistent subjects whether it is a Nash
equlibrium strategy (“equilibrium” = 1), whether it is the maxmax strategy (“maxmax”
= 1) and whether it is the maxmin strategy (“maxmin” = 1). “n baseline” indicates
the number of pure strategies in treatment baseline, “n info” the number of strategies in
treatment info.
Table 3.12: Properties of strategies available to consistent subjects, by treatment
equilibrium maxmax maxmin n baseline n info
0 0 0 332 322
0 1 0 236 199
1 1 1 187 189
0 0 1 182 143
0 1 1 61 56
1 1 0 56 44
1 0 1 34 37
1 0 0 24 26
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A.3 Instructions
Treatment Baseline: Instructions Part 1
1 General Information
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation! Please
switch off your mobile phone now and do not communicate with each other any
more. If you have a question, raise your hand, we will come over to your seat and
answer it individually. In this experiment, you can earn a substantial amount of
money. The amount you earn depends on your own decisions, the decisions of the
other participants and on chance. The amount of money earned will be paid out
to all participants individually in cash at the end of the experiment. During the
experiment, everyone makes his decisions anonymously on his own. At no point in
time will your decisions be linked to your identity.
This experiment consists of two parts, which are identical for all participants:
In the first part you are shown eight different payoff-combinations, which you are
supposed to evaluate. Each of these combinations consists of two numbers (x, y).
The first number x corresponds to the amount of Euro that you receive yourself
in this situation. The second number y corresponds to the amount that another
participant receives. You are supposed to establish a ranking (a so called ”preference
relationship”) over all these payoff-combinations (x, y). That means, you indicate
which of these combinations you like best, which one second-best, and so on. The
exact procedure will be explained again step by step later on.
The ranking created in this way, as well your decisions in part two of the ex-
periment, will not be revealed to any other participant. After each participant has
created such a ranking over the payoff-combinations, part two of the experiment will
begin. Both parts of the experiment are run at the computer. Before they start, you
are asked several control questions, which shall help you in your understanding of the
experiment. For the second part, you will receive separate instructions. At the end
of the experiment, there will be a short questionnaire and then you will be paid in
cash.
Your total payoff consists of two payments. In order to determine these payments,
one of the decisions made in either part 1 or part 2 of the experiment will be randomly
selected. Further details will be provided later on.
1
2 Evaluation of Payoff-combinations
We will now explain the first part of the experiment, the evaluation of payoff-combinations.
You will perform this task immediately afterwards at the computer. You will first be
shown the following screen:
In the row below “Payoffs” you see the eight different payoff-combinations (x, y),
which you are supposed to rank (all amounts are in Euro). The payoff combinations
are currently ordered randomly. (Remember: The left value x is the amount you
receive yourself and the right value y is given to a randomly selected other participant.)
You will now assign a number between 1 and 8 to each of these payoff-combinations.
The number 1 corresponds to the first rank, which you shall assign to the combina-
tion you like best. Analogously the second rank shall be assigned to your second-best
combination and so forth until rank 8, which corresponds to your least preferred com-
bination. If you consider two or more combinations as equally good, you are allowed
to assign the same rank/number to them.
2
After you created your ranking, you will see the following screen:
Here you see the payoff-combinations, ordered according to your previously stated
preferences. If you like, you can still make modifications. After all participants con-
firmed their ranking, the second part of the experiment will begin.
3
3 Calculation of your Final Payoff
The one and only payoff-relevant decision will be randomly selected at the end of the
experiment. Your total payoff depends on whether a decision from the first or the
second part of the experiment is selected.
With a probability of
7
8
a decision of part one will be chosen. In this case, two of
the eight payoff-combinations will be randomly selected. The payoff combination that
you ranked more highly will then be paid out. (If both combinations have the same
rank, one of these two will be randomly selected.). You will receive the first amount,
the value x. In addition, every participant receives exactly one additional payment
y that corresponds to the second amount y of a payment-combination selected for
some other participant.(The assignment is carried out in such a way that the second
amount y from your decision is not distributed to a participant you are interacting
with during the experiment or from whom you receive the second amount yourself.)
Payoff, if selected decision is from part one:
Total payoff = Amount x from own decision + Amount y from decision of some
other participant
The probability that a decision from part two is chosen for payment is
1
8
. In
that case, payments depend on the actions chosen by the participants in part two.
The calculation of the final payoff for this case will be explained in the instructions
for this part. (The random draw will be performed by a participant at the end of
the experiment. For that purpose he draws a card from a deck containing 32 cards
numbered 1 to 32. The numbers 1-28 correspond to all possible combinations of two
out of the eight payoff-pairs (x, y)) from the first part. If a number between 29-32 is
drawn, a decision from the second part will be paid out.)
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Treatment Baseline: Instructions Part 2
The second part of the experiment is run at the computer as well. This part
consists of four strategic decision situations, in the following referred to as “games”.
In each of these situations, you will be matched with a different participant as game
partner, that means you never interact with the same person twice. You and the
other player simultaneously select one of two possible actions. The row player always
chooses between one of the two actions “up” and “down” and the column player
always decides between the actions “left” and “right”. (For the sake of simplicity,
the game will be displayed for every participant in such a way, that he always acts in
the role as row player and the game partner in the role as column player.)
In every game, there are four possible outcomes. Which one of these outcomes is
selected depends on the action you chose as well as on the action the other player
chooses. The four outcomes are are displayed in the form of a payoff matrix. The
combination (x, y) in one cell of the matrix corresponds to the amounts of money
the two players receive, if the corresponding actions have been chosen. Analogously
to the first part, the left value x indicates the amount of money in Euro that you
receive and the right value y corresponds to the payoff of the other player. The
combinations (x, y) are chosen in such a way, that they assume the exact
same values as those from the first part of the experiment. Thus in every
game there appear four out of the eight payoff pairs evaluated in part one.
If a situation from the second part is chosen for payment, the involved players
receive the payoffs that correspond to the outcome of the game. In contrast to the
first part, each player only receives one amount of money from the payoff-relevant
decision. In addition, each player is given a fixed payment of 5 Euro.
Total payoff = 5 Euro + Payment x obtained in the selected game
In addition to the monetary payments, you are also shown the ranking of the
payoff-pairs used in the current game that you submitted in the first part of the
experiment.
5
In the computer program, you will see the following screen:
For the sake of clarity, not the exact numbers of the ranking will be shown there,
but instead 1-4 stars. A value of four stars (****) means that the corresponding
payoff-combination was ranked by you as the best combination (among those appear-
ing in the game). Accordingly, the worst combination is marked by one star (*)
Example:
Let us consider the game shown on the screen “Game 1”. If, for example, you decide
to play “up” and the other player chooses “right”, then you receive a payoff of 8 Euros
and your game partner a payoff of 3 Euros. Additionally, you can see in the matrix
below, that this is your most preferred outcome.
Are there any questions?
If this is not the case, the second part of the experiment will start shortly...
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Treatment Info: Instructions Part 1
1. General Information
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation! Please
switch off your mobile phone now and do not communicate with each other any
more. If you have a question, raise your hand, we will come over to your seat and
answer it individually. In this experiment, you can earn a substantial amount of
money. The amount you earn depends on your own decisions, the decisions of the
other participants and on chance. The amount of money earned will be paid out to
all participants individually in cash at the end of the experiment.
This experiment consists of two parts, which are identical for all participants:
In the first part you are shown eight different payoff-combinations, which you are
supposed to evaluate. Each of these combinations consists of two numbers (x, y).
The first number x corresponds to the amount of Euro that you receive yourself
in this situation. The second number y corresponds to the amount that another
participant receives. You are supposed to establish a ranking (a so called ”preference
relationship”) over all these payoff-combinations (x, y). That means, you indicate
which of these combinations you like best, which one second-best, and so on. The
exact procedure will be explained again step by step later on.
After each participant has created such a ranking over the payoff-combinations,
part two of the experiment will begin. In this part, the information provided in the
first part of the experiment will be used. Two participants at a time will be shown each
others’ ranking of the payoff-pairs provided in part one of the experiment. In both
parts of the experiment, you will interact with other participants using a computer.
Before we start, you will be asked several control questions, which shall help you in
your understanding of the experiment. For the second part, you will receive separate
instructions. At the end of the experiment, there will be a short questionnaire and
then you will be paid in cash.
Your total payoff consists of two payments. In order to determine these payments,
one of the decisions made in either part 1 or part 2 of the experiment will be randomly
selected. Further details will be provided later on.
7
2. Evaluation of Payoff-combinations
We will now explain the first part of the experiment, the evaluation of payoff-combinations.
You will perform this task immediately afterwards at the computer. You will first be
shown the following screen:
In the row below “Payoffs” you see the eight different payoff-combinations (x, y),
which you are supposed to rank (all amounts are in Euro). The payoff combinations
are currently ordered randomly. (Remember: The left value x is the amount you
receive yourself and the right value y is given to a randomly selected other participant.)
You will now assign a number between 1 and 8 to each of these payoff-combinations.
The number 1 corresponds to the first rank, which you shall assign to the combina-
tion you like best. Analogously the second rank shall be assigned to your second-best
combination and so forth until rank 8, which corresponds to your least preferred com-
bination. If you consider two or more combinations as equally good, you are allowed
to assign the same rank/number to them.
8
After you created your ranking, you will see the following screen:
Here you see the payoff-combinations, ordered according to your previously stated
preferences. If you like, you can still make modifications. After all participants con-
firmed their ranking, the second part of the experiment will begin.
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3. Calculation of your Final Payoff
The one and only payoff-relevant decision will be randomly selected at the end of the
experiment. Your total payoff depends on whether a decision from the first or the
second part of the experiment is selected.
With a probability of
7
8
a decision of part one will be chosen. In this case, two of
the eight payoff-combinations will be randomly selected. The payoff combination that
you ranked more highly will then be paid out. (If both combinations have the same
rank, one of these two will be randomly selected.). You will receive the first amount,
the value x. In addition, every participant receives exactly one additional payment
y that corresponds to the second amount y of a payment-combination selected for
some other participant.(The assignment is carried out in such a way that the second
amount y from your decision is not distributed to a participant you are interacting
with during the experiment or from whom you receive the second amount yourself.)
Payoff, if selected decision is from part one:
Total payoff = Amount x from own decision + Amount y from decision of some
other participant
The probability that a decision from part two is chosen for payment is
1
8
. In
that case, payments depend on the actions chosen by the participants in part two.
The calculation of the final payoff for this case will be explained in the instructions
for this part. (The random draw will be performed by a participant at the end of
the experiment. For that purpose he draws a card from a deck containing 32 cards
numbered 1 to 32. The numbers 1-28 correspond to all possible combinations of two
out of the eight payoff-pairs (x, y)) from the first part. If a number between 29-32 is
drawn, a decision from the second part will be paid out.)
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Treatment Info: Instructions Part 2
The second part of the experiment is run at the computer as well. This part
consists of four strategic decision situations, in the following referred to as “games”.
In each of these situations, you will be matched with a different participant as game
partner, that means you never interact with the same person twice. You and the
other player simultaneously select one of two possible actions. The row player always
chooses between one of the two actions “up” and “down” and the column player
always decides between the actions “left” and “right”. (For the sake of simplicity,
the game will be displayed for every participant in such a way, that he always acts in
the role as row player and the game partner in the role as column player.)
In every game, there are four possible outcomes. Which one of these outcomes is
selected depends on the action you chose as well as on the action the other player
chooses. The four outcomes are are displayed in the form of a payoff matrix. The
combination (x, y) in one cell of the matrix corresponds to the amounts of money
the two players receive, if the corresponding actions have been chosen. Analogously
to the first part, the left value x indicates the amount of money in Euro that you
receive and the right value y corresponds to the payoff of the other player. The
combinations (x, y) are chosen in such a way, that they assume the exact
same values as those from the first part of the experiment. Thus in every
game there appear four out of the eight payoff pairs evaluated in part one.
If a situation from the second part is chosen for payment, the involved players
receive the payoffs that correspond to the outcome of the game. In contrast to the
first part, each player only receives one amount of money from the payoff-relevant
decision. In addition, each player is given a fixed payment of 5 Euro.
Total payoff = 5 Euro + Payment x obtained in the selected game
As announced before, you will now receive information about each others’ pref-
erences. This means that in addition to the payoff matrix you are shown another
matrix below, in which you can see how you and the other player ranked the payoff
combinations used in the current game in the first part of the experiment. Note:
you interact with a different partner in every game and therefore the ranking of your
opponent may change from one game to another.
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In the computer program, you will see the following screen:
For the sake of clarity, not the exact numbers of the ranking will be shown there,
but instead 1-4 stars. A value of four stars (****) means that the corresponding
payoff-combination was ranked by you as the best combination (among those appear-
ing in the game). Accordingly, the worst combination is marked by one star (*)
Example:
Let us consider the game shown on the screen “Game 1”. If, for example, you decide
to play “up” and the other player chooses “right”, then you receive a payoff of 8 Euros
and your game partner a payoff of 3 Euros. Additionally, you can see in the matrix
below, that this is your most preferred outcome, but the least preferred outcome of the
other player.
Are there any questions?
If this is not the case, the second part of the experiment will start shortly...
12
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Chapter 4
Social Capital
Inequality, Fairness and Social Capital†
Abstract We study the impact of unjust inequality on social trust and trustworthiness,
and how it interacts with economic status in a large-scale controlled experiment. We
document that unfair economic inequality is detrimental for social interactions, resulting
in a significant decline in trust and trustworthiness. Probing the boundaries of this
effect, we demonstrate that this erosion of social capital critically depends on the context:
if an economically successful person is not directly responsible for the outcome of the
unsuccessful per-son, we observe no negative effects on trust and trustworthiness in the
aggregate. Finally, our data do not support the view that higher status or wealth leads
to an erosion of pro-social attitudes: the successful are always more generous, whereas
unsuccessful persons display the least efficient and generous behavior.
†Joint work with Dietmar Fehr, Stefan T. Trautmann and Yilong Xu
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4.1 Introduction
The recent surge of income and wealth inequality in many developed countries is a widely
discussed topic in the media and academic research. Much of these discussions revolve
around the gains of the top-income decile and the stagnation of income for the bottom
half of the distribution and its implications for society (e.g.,Piketty & Saez, 2003; Autor
et al., 2008; Piketty & Saez, 2014; Piketty et al., 2017, Alvaredo et al., 2017). Indeed,
inequality deriving from competitive economic environments is often associated with nega-
tive societal consequences (Stiglitz, 2012; Verhaeghe, 2014). In particular, it is sometimes
conjectured that inequality may harm the social fabric, destroying social capital (trust,
honesty, cooperation) and subsequently affecting economic outcomes (Wilkinson et al.,
2009). Two hypotheses can be derived from the literature in economics and the social
sciences. The first hypothesis states that higher inequality, especially if perceived as un-
just and caused by competition, hampers economic interaction (Alesina & Perotti, 1996;
Benabou, 1996; Camera et al., 2016). The second hypothesis states that those who are
in an advantageous position (of higher status or wealth) in an unequal society, become
self-focused and greedy (Piff et al., 2012; Piff, 2013; Fisman et al., 2015; Guinote et al.,
2015; Nishi et al., 2015). That is, negative social consequences are caused by the behavior
of the successful.
Both of these hypotheses are contested in the literature. However, empirical assessments
of the effects of inequality and the role of the successful often suffer from an absence of
counterfactuals and the endogeneity of status. Experimental methods offer an alternative
approach for assessing the consequences of inequality as they make exogenous variation
of inequality, the underlying causes of inequality, institutions and available information
possible (e.g., Falk & Heckman, 2009; Charness & Fehr, 2015). While potentially having
lower external validity, experiments thus provide a clear identification of causal effects
and underlying processes.
We use experimental methods to study the impact of unjust inequality on subsequent
social interactions, differentiating between the behavior of the economically successful
and the unsuccessful. Our design thus aims to test both hypotheses within the same
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setting. We create income inequality in dyads, using a real-effort procedure with varying
payment schemes. Subsequently, we let these dyads interact in a modified trust game
allowing us to measure both players’ social trust and trustworthiness. Social trust has
been interpreted as an important component of social capital in the literature (Glaeser et
al., 2000; Bellemare & Kro¨ger, 2007; Bjoernskov, 2018; Langer et al., 2017). As higher
social capital is typically associated with better-functioning institutions and society in
general (Putman, 2000) , social trust is a center piece in the debate on whether inequality
erodes the social fabric.51 In addition, our experimental measure for trustworthiness
allows us to quantify subjects’ greed or altruism absent strategic motives. It directly tests
the hypothesis that higher inequality has a negative impact on social interactions because
successful people become less generous, in particular less generous than the unsuccessful.
We create exogenous variation in income inequality in the real-effort task by randomly
assigning subjects to two different payment schemes. In our baseline condition subjects
receive a piece-rate payment. This results in relatively low inequality and is typically
not perceived as unjust. We compare the trust-game outcomes in this setting with an
environment that features unjust and high inequality. To generate high inequality, we
implement a relative-payment scheme that gives an undue advantage to one participant
in the dyad.52 This undermines equality of opportunity and the payment scheme can
thus be seen as unfair from a normative perspective (e.g., Roemer, 2008). In a third
condition, we employ the same relative-payment scheme to generate unjust inequality
as before, but randomly rematch participants in the trust-game stage (keeping earnings
information constant across conditions). This eliminates the direct responsibility for each
other’s outcomes in the dyads and has the advantage of observing matches with equal
51More precisely, social capital can be defined as values and shared beliefs that help groups to cooperate
in situations where contracts are difficult or impossible to enforce (cp., Guiso et al., 2004). According
to this definition it is possible to measure social capital by eliciting values and beliefs with experimental
tools such as the trust game (see e.g., E. Fehr, 2009 for an extensive account of the measurement of
trust and trust beliefs). In the economic literature social capital has been positively associated with a
plethora of economic outcomes, such as economic growth (e.g., Knack & Keefer, 1997), the size of firms
(e.g., Bloom et al., 2012) or financial development (e.g., Guiso et al., 2004).
52There is evidence documenting that (high) inequality is not per se seen as unfair (e.g., Breza et al.,
2017; D. Fehr, 2018). For example, D. Fehr (2018) illustrates that an increase in inequality leads to
more antisocial behavior but only if higher inequality cannot be clearly attributed to work effort and
is possibly the result of immoral behavior.
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and unequal outcomes.
Our results support the view that unjust inequality can negatively affect social inter-
actions. That is, we document a significant decline in trust and trustworthiness when in-
come inequality is the result of an income-generating process that is eminently perceived
as unfair. However, we also find that this observed decline depends on a direct interaction
in the first stage, i.e., when the well-off (“successful”) player causing the poor out-come
of the worse-off (“unsuccessful”) player. If we take away the direct interaction by re-
matching participants in the trust game, we find that especially the successful players
maintain a high level of trust and trustworthiness, in particular when interacting among
themselves. That is, the detrimental impact of inequality on social interactions critically
depends on contextual factors.
We do not find evidence that the advantageous social position makes people more self-
ish: successful players are consistently more generous than the unsuccessful in absolute
terms. However, holding the successful accountable to higher normative standards (such
as sharing the trust game pie equally), or evaluating generosity in terms of giving relative
to someone’s wealth position, we may well argue that they fall short on these standards.
In the next section, we introduce the experimental paradigm and design of our study
followed by a description of how we induce unjust inequality. Section 3 shows that our
experimental paradigm successfully induces inequality differences and a polarization of
fairness perceptions. Clearly, neither inequality nor competitiveness have to be perceived
negatively per se (e.g. Cappelen et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 2014; Bartling et al., 2017).
Rather, it is the combination of inequality and unequal opportunity within a competitive
environment that triggers strong feelings of injustice in our experimental setup. While
pooling these features hides their marginal contribution to the perception of unfairness, it
guarantees a powerful prime to reliably quantify the effects of unjust inequality on social
interactions and, arguably, mirrors many settings outside the laboratory.53 Competition,
unequal opportunities, and inequality are, for example, inherent features of school edu-
53Note that our paradigm can be extended to identify the marginal impact of the different features of
the environment. However, the effects may not be additive making it impossible to disentangle them.
See section 4.2.1 for a more thorough discussion of this issue.
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cation,universities, workplaces or labor markets more generally.54 Section 4 discusses the
effects of unjust inequality in fixed dyads and Section 5 discusses the effects when direct
attributions of responsibility for others’ outcomes cannot be made. We evaluate these
results in the context of the related literature in section 6.
4.2 Experimental Paradigm and Design
The current study employs an experimental paradigm in which dyads of participants inter-
act in two stages. In the first stage, a repeated real-effort task involves either an individual
piece-rate payment, or a competitive tournament with a favorable condition for the initial
tournament winner (in a between-subjects design). While the piece-rate condition leads to
modest inequality depending on individual performance, the tournaments amplify income
differences in a way that is difficult to justify by the observed performance differences.
In the second stage these same dyads then interact in a trust game. Consequently, we
observe trust and trustworthiness depending on stage-1 conditions, and depending on
stage-1 income. In a third treatment, the tournament-based real-effort stage is followed
by a trust-game stage involving new matches of dyads, which have, however, exactly the
same degree of information on each other’s earnings as dyads in the fixed-pair tournament
condition.
In the following, we first describe the stage-1 income manipulation, and the elicitation of
fairness judgments. We then provide details on the trust game stage with fixed dyads,
and new dyads. Our three treatments are called Piece Rate (first-stage piece rate - fixed
dyads); Tournament (first-stage tournament - fixed dyads); and Tournament-New (first-
stage tournament - new partner in stage 2).
54For example Lemieux et al. (2009) document an economy-wide increase of performance-pay jobs in
the U.S. labor market, along with a substantial increase in wage inequality. Features of competitive
environments are innately linked to relative status concerns or relative-income comparisons, and it is
long known that individuals care about their standing relative to others (e.g., Veblen, 2017). Several
recent experimental studies suggest that such comparisons have, for example, detrimental effects on
well-being (Card et al., 2012) or ethical behavior (e.g., Gill et al., 2013; John et al., 2014).
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4.2.1 Stage 1: Inequality Manipulation
We implement a repeated real-effort slider task (Gill & Prowse, 2012) and vary the pay-
ment scheme to manipulate inequality, i.e., low inequality versus high and potentially
unjust inequality. In the slider task, participants see a number of sliders on their com-
puter screen and have to adjust each slider to exactly the middle position within a certain
time limit (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). The goal in this task is to maximize the
number of correctly positioned sliders before the allotted time runs out. Participants are
only allowed to use their mouse to drag the sliders into the correct position.55 The task
requires little apriori knowledge and skills such that outcomes mainly depend on the ex-
pended effort of subjects. Unfairness or concerns about unequal opportunities arise only
through institutional features, i.e., the details of the implemented payment scheme.
In the low-inequality condition (Piece Rate), participants complete four rounds of this
task, each lasting for 120 seconds. In each round, they receive a flat payment of e0.50
plus e0.05 per correctly placed slider. Total earnings are calculated by summing up the
earnings in the four rounds. Note that each subject in a dyad individually determines
her own earnings, i.e., there is no interaction. However, at the end of each round both
subjects in the dyad are informed about the correctly positioned sliders and the resulting
earnings of each other. Thus, social comparison is also salient in this setting.
In the high-inequality conditions (Tournament and Tournament-New), participants in a
dyad also complete the slider task four times. In contrast to the Piece Rate condition,
participants’ payoffs in each round are determined through a relative performance scheme.
That is, the subject with the higher number of correctly placed sliders in a round receives
e3.00, while the subject with the lower number of correctly placed sliders receives e0.30.
In the case of equal performance, the two payments are randomly allocated. As in Piece
Rate, participants receive information on the performance of each subject and the resulting
payoffs after each round.
In addition to the high payoff, the subject with the higher performance receives a time
bonus. More specifically, after an initial time budget of 120 second for both subjects, the
55To avoid cheating, we used a keyboard locker to prevent students from using the arrow keys or the
mouse wheel.
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winner of the first round obtains a time bonus of 8 seconds, and the winners of the second
and third round get a time bonus of 6 and 4 seconds, respectively. The time bonus is
subtracted from the time budget of the tournament loser in the respective round.
Tournament incentives are ubiquitous in economic life, and typically lead to a more spread
pay distribution (and thus more inequality) than the underlying effort and ability justifies
(Frank & Cook, 2010). We mimic this observation in our setup with a large difference
in tournament prizes for winners and losers that hardly warrants the observed effort
differences within dyads in a given round. This income difference magnifies over the
rounds because of the substantial time gap (16 seconds) that arises after the first round
and that makes it nearly impossible for the first-round loser to catch up in the subsequent
rounds.56 The condition thus induces inequality, caused by a competitive procedure that
is difficult to justify on fairness grounds. In addition, this feature allows subjects to
grow into their favorable or unfavorable economic positions over the course of the three
remaining real-effort task rounds. This seems important in view of the conjecture that
the successful are responsible for the erosion of the societal cooperation (e.g., Piff et al.,
2012; Piff, 2013). For example, Piff (2013) observes that rich players in a rigged Monopoly
Game experiment favoring their own economic status become increasingly imperious as
inequality gets larger.
Note that our Tournament design includes two components - competition and unjust
procedure - that are absent in the Piece Rate condition and additionally results in higher
income inequality than the Piece Rate condition. These three aspects arguably go often
hand in hand in real-world settings, where initial advantages are amplified in competi-
tive contexts, leading to enhanced inequality (e.g., Frank & Cook, 2010; Stiglitz, 2012).
For example, if performance in or quality of primary school determines access to bet-
ter secondary schools and subsequently to college, students end up with better jobs and
higher earnings (see e.g., Chetty et al., 2011). At the same time, combining these three
aspects provides a powerful instrument to probe the effects of (unjust) income inequality
on social interactions. This is important as previous evidence suggests that inequality
56Note that winning the first round depends on exerted effort and to a large degree on matching luck
(i.e., the random assignment of the interaction partner).
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effects are subtle (see discussion in Section 4.6). As such, our focus is on maximizing the
impact of inequality in the Tournament conditions in comparison to the inequality in the
Piece Rate condition, and not on fully differentiating the marginal effects of the three
ingredients (higher inequality, competition, unjust procedure).
4.2.2 Stage 1: Measurement of Fairness Perception
We measure subjects’ fairness evaluations of the payment schemes to assess whether the
piece rate versus tournament manipulation was successful in creating perceptions of unfair
inequality. To gauge the impact of the procedures on participants, we measure fairness
perceptions both before and after the stage-1 game. At the beginning of the experiment,
participants receive the detailed instructions about the stage-1 real-effort task and the
payment procedures of their condition. They then answer three control questions about
the procedure. Next, they are asked to indicate on a scale from 0 (very unfair) to 10 (very
fair) how fair they consider the payment procedures in stage 1. They also indicate their
gender, age, and field of study. After that they start with the real-effort task.
The first assessment provides a fairness judgment based on a verbal description of the
mechanism, absent any experience of the task and the outcomes. Our second measurement
takes place immediately after the end of stage 1. Subjects have then completed four rounds
of the real-effort task and received feedback on the number of correctly placed sliders and
the corresponding payoffs of both subjects in the dyad. Thus, we can observe whether and
how experiencing the task and the resulting feedback affects subjects’ fairness evaluations.
4.2.3 Stage 2: Measurement of Social-Interaction Effects
In the second stage, we use a trust game to measure the effects of the exogenous income
variation on social interactions. In this game there are two player roles, the first mover
(trustor) and the second mover (trustee). The first mover has an endowment of e6.00
while the second mover has an endowment of e0.00. The first mover decides whether or
not to transfer her endowment to the second mover. If she does not transfer, the game
ends and the earnings will be e6.00 for the first mover and e0.00 for the second mover.
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In contrast, if she transfers her endowment, the experimenter triples the endowment such
that the second mover receives e18.00 (and first mover has e0.00 now). The second
mover then decides how much of the e18.00 to send back to the first mover (by the cent).
Payoffs follow directly from the second mover’s decision.
To obtain information on both decisions and the underlying processes, we use the strategy
method. More precisely, we first elicit from each player in the dyad their decision as a
first mover, and then their decision as a second mover conditional on having received a
transfer (because otherwise there is no decision to be made). The player roles in the game
are randomly determined after all decisions have been made and subjects are well aware
of this fact. Therefore, this modification allows us to answer our first research question
(i.e., the effect of inequality on trust in other individuals in a group; first mover) and
the second research question (i.e., the greediness of individuals as a function of stage-1
income; second mover), within the same context.
We also measure participants’ beliefs regarding the behavior of the other player in this
stage. Specifically, we ask subjects to indicate whether they believe the other player
in the dyad transferred her endowment when acting as a first mover (yes/no), and to
indicate how much they think the other player sends back when acting as second mover
(in six ranges: e0 to e3.00; e3.01 to e6.00; ...; e15.01 to e18.00). We do not incentivize
beliefs because the preclusion of hedging opportunities would have required rather complex
randomizations. Given the randomization in the implementation of the strategy method
we did not want to complicate matters further.
We implemented two variations of the trust game stage. In condition Piece Rate and
Tournament, stage-1 dyads remain intact and proceed together to stage 2. We emphasized
at the very beginning of the experiment that subjects will interact with the same partner
throughout the whole experiment. At the start of stage 2, subjects are reminded of this
fact. They also receive a reminder of their own and the other person’s stage-1 earnings
before making any choices in the trust game. In contrast, in condition Tournament-New
the dyads are re-matched in stage 2, such that each person will play with a person with
whom she did not interact in stage 1. Again, we made clear at the beginning of the
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experiment that they interact with different, randomly determined subjects in the two
stages. At the beginning of stage 2, they were informed about the new match and they
received information on their own and the other persons’ (the new partner in the dyad)
earnings from stage 1. This design precludes attributions of responsibility for each other’s
stage-1 outcomes. Moreover, as only earnings (but not effort) are communicated, is it not
possible to attribute high or low stage-1 earnings to luck or effort.
4.2.4 Procedural details and variable definitions
In total, 636 subjects took part in the experiment that was programmed using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007): 160 in condition Piece Rate, 134 in condition Tournament, and
342 in condition Tournament-New. While we conducted Piece Rate and Tournament in
parallel, we added Tournament-New after completing the other conditions to scrutinize
the generality of the results. The first two conditions were run on a subject pool at the
Universities in Heidelberg and Mannheim (balanced across conditions). For condition
Tournament-New we used the same subject pool and recruited 202 new subjects. In
addition we ran sessions at the laboratory at the Technical University Berlin with a
total of 140 subjects to increase power, given the larger number of subgroups in matching
stage-1 winners and losers. Participants were undergraduate students from a wide range of
different majors, who were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) in Berlin and Mannheim
and with Hroot (Bock et al., 2014) in Heidelberg.
Final payoffs were determined by adding payoffs from both the real-effort stage and the
trust game. A typical session lasted about 50 minutes, and subjects earned, on average
about e13.40 (approximately $14.70 at that time), with final payoffs ranging from e1.20
to e30. There was no show-up fee in addition to the incentivized payoffs; that is, incentives
were very salient.
At the beginning of a session we matched participants in equal-gender dyads, with one
mixed dyad if there was an uneven number of (fe)males. This was done based on the
information about each subjects’ gender from the initial questionnaire. The matching
procedure was anonymous and in particular subjects were not aware of the exact match-
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ing procedure. We implemented this matching procedure to control for possible gender
differences in the performance in the multiple-round slider task (Gill & Prowse, 2014) and
in the behavior in the trust game (Bellemare & Kro¨ger, 2007).
In the presentation of the results we use the following conventions. In the fixed dyads
conditions Piece Rate and Tournament we will call the person with the higher in-
come in a dyad “successful” and the person with the lower income “unsuccessful”. In
the Tournament-New condition, participants encounter new partners, leading to various
matches based on the stage-1 income. In the presentation, we denote subjects as “suc-
cessful” if stage 1 income equals e12.00 and as “unsuccessful” if stage-1 income equals
e1.20. This definition reflects the typical payoff pattern for the successful and unsuccess-
ful in condition Tournament (results are robust to alternative definitions). In our analysis
using the successful-unsuccessful denomination, we drop observations with equal income
(in Piece Rate and Tournament, N=12) and unclassified subjects with an income between
e12.00 and e1.20 (in Tournament-New, N=54).
4.3 Results: Income Inequality Manipulation
We first provide evidence on effort levels, i.e., the number of correctly positioned sliders,
in the different conditions. The Piece Rate andTournament conditions did not result
in different levels of effort with an average number of correctly solved sliders of 75 in
Piece Rate and 76 in Tournament in all four rounds (p = 0.795, two-sided t-test). Effort
in Tournament-New was somewhat higher at 81 compared to Tournament (t = 2.28,
p = 0.023). Importantly, the average difference in effort levels between the two players in
a dyad in the first slider task does not differ in all three conditions (3.93 in Piece Rate,
4.33 in Tournament, and 4.54 in Tournament-New, two-sided t-tests, all p > 0.28).
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Table 4.1: Stage-1 Earnings
Piece-Rate Tournament Tournament-New
Earnings: mean 5.77 6.60 6.60
Earnings: median 5.75 6.60 6.60
Earnings: 10% percentile 4.93 1.20 1.20
Earnings: 90% percentile 6.70 12.00 12.00
Notes: Entries are in e.
Table 4.1 displays stage-1 earnings and shows that the tournament condition has the
intended effect on inequality. While average earnings are comparable across the different
treatments, the variation in earnings is much larger in Tournament and Tournament-New
than in Piece Rate. That is, small initial differences in effort translate into vast income
inequality in Tournament and Tournament-New, but not in Piece Rate.
It is conceivable that subjects perceive the high reward for the tournament winner as
justified, taking a meritocratic perspective and focus on incentives for performance (see
e.g., Cappelen et al., 2007). This is not what happens in the current context.
Table 4.2: Fairness Evaluation of Payment Mechanism
Point of evaluation Evaluators Piece Rate Tournament Tournament-New
Before experience All 7.17 3.69∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗
(n=160) (n=134) (n=342)
After experience All 6.78+++ 2.44+++,∗∗∗ 2.90+++,∗∗∗
(n=160) (n=134) (n=342)
After experience Successful 7.32 2.98∗∗∗ 3.57∗∗∗
(n=78) (n=63) (n=144)
Unsuccessful 6.36## 1.92##,∗∗∗ 2.00###,∗∗∗
(n=78) (n=63) (n=144)
Notes: Entries are fairness ratings ranging from 0 (perceived as very unfair) to 10 (perceived as
very fair). Significance levels: 10%, 5%,1% (two-sided t-test); pairs with equal earnings excluded
in analyses of successful and unsuccessful. *,**,*** indicates significant difference between
Piece Rate and Tournament conditions. #,##,### indicates significant difference between
successful and unsuccessful. +,++,+++ indicates significant difference between evaluation
before and after experience.
Table 4.2 shows that participants perceive the tournament mechanism as substantially
less fair than the piece-rate mechanism. We observe strong treatment differences both
4. Social Capital 119
before and after the experience of the task and for both the successful and the unsuccess-
ful: the piece-rate scheme always receives much higher fairness evaluations than the two
tournament schemes. Experiencing the task leads to lower evaluations compared to the
mere verbal description for all three conditions. In all three conditions, the unsuccessful
perceive the task as less fair than the successful.
We conclude that the stage-1 manipulation succeeded in inducing strong differences in
income inequality and fairness perceptions across piece rate and tournament conditions.
Moreover, successful and unsuccessful subjects strongly differ in their fairness perceptions,
reflecting a self-serving bias that might have lead the successful to perceive the procedures
and resulting positional differences as more justifiable than the unsuccessful.
4.4 Results: Social Interaction Effects for Fixed
Dyads
4.4.1 Main Effects
We now turn to the analysis of whether the strong differences in payoff inequality and
fairness perception between Piece Rate and Tournament affect behavior in the stage-2
trust game. Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3 show our main results. We observe strong treatment
effects, with the share of trusting participants (i.e., transferring their endowment to the
second mover) being almost 20 percentage points lower in Tournament than in Piece Rate
(top panel, Table 4.3). Trust is significantly lower in Tournament for both the successful
and the unsuccessful. However, we do not detect significant differences in trust between
these subgroups in either treatment.
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Figure 4.1: Trust rates and returns (in e) in Piece Rate and Tournament
Table 4.3: Social interaction effects of payment mechanism
Point of evaluation Evaluators Piece Rate Tournament
Trusting
All 71% (n=160) 53%∗∗∗ (n=134)
Successful 71% (n=78) 49%∗∗∗ (n=63)
Unsuccessful 71% (n=78) 56%∗∗∗ (n=63)
Amount returned
All e6.41 (n=154) e5.50∗∗ (n=134)
Successful e6.30 (n=78) e6.10 (n=63)
Unsuccessful e6.55 (n=78) e4.65##,∗∗∗ (n=63)
Notes: Significance levels: 10%, 5%,1% (two-sided t-test); pairs with equal earnings excluded
in analyses of successful and unsuccessful. *,**,*** indicates significant difference between
Piece Rate and Tournament conditions. #,##,### indicates significant difference between
successful and unsuccessful.
Result 1: Unjust inequality in stage 1 is detrimental for social trust in stage-2 interaction
for fixed dyads.
The bottom panel of Table 4.3 shows the amounts returned by the second mover. Re-
member that there are no strategic considerations at this stage and that these amounts
are conditional on the trust decision of the first mover resulting in a budget of e18 for
the second mover and e0 for the first-mover. We observe that amounts returned are
almost e1 lower in the Tournament than in the Piece Rate condition (6.4 vs 5.5). Thus,
transferring the budget implies an expected loss for the first mover in Tournament. This
effect is mainly driven by the behavior of the unsuccessful stage-1 subjects. While there
4. Social Capital 121
is no difference in the amounts returned across conditions for the successful, the stage-1
losers strongly reduce these amounts in Tournament. Consequently, amounts returned
are significantly lower for the unsuccessful than for the successful in Tournament.
Despite the higher amounts returned in Tournament by the successful, we may argue that
they still fall strongly short of relevant normative benchmarks. First, they give less than
the unsuccessful relative to their wealth. Second, in spite of having typically earned e12 in
stage 1 (vs. e1.20 for their partner), they are far from sharing the stage-2 income (return
e9), or overall income (return e15.60) equally. However, failure to meet such normative
criteria is not restricted to the successful. In Piece Rate, stage-1 payoff differences are
modest in most dyads, and both the successful and the unsuccessful fail to share their
income equally (return e9). It seems that in general, stage-1 income is not taken into
consideration when deciding about how much to return to the trustor. The observer’s
higher normative expectations towards the stage-1 winners make this behavior look less
acceptable for the successful in Tournament.
Result 2: Unjust inequality in stage 1 is detrimental for generosity in stage-2 interaction
for fixed dyads.
Result 3: In the low-inequality environment (Piece Rate) both the winners and the losers
are equally generous; in the high-inequality environment (Tournament) the winners are
more generous in absolute terms, and less generous relative to their wealth.
While reduced trustworthiness (generosity) affects the distribution of trust game earnings
resulting in a higher variance and skewness, reduced trust affects overall welfare because
of the inefficiency of forgoing the tripled payoffs after transfer. Indeed, we observe that
the welfare effects are substantial. Expected trust game earnings are e1.08 lower in
the Tournament condition (e7.26 vs. e6.18), a 15% loss compared to the Piece Rate
condition.
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4.4.2 Underlying Mechanism
The previous analysis has illustrated that there are substantial differences in trust and
trustworthiness in the fixed-dyad design of the Tournament vs. Piece Rate condition. Our
controlled laboratory context allows us to shed more light on the underlying mechanisms
of this effect. We discuss the role of beliefs, the effect of pure inequality (not necessarily
perceived as unjust), and the case of random losses in dyads with equal performance in
Tournament.
Beliefs. In stage 2 we measured subjects’ beliefs regarding the other player’s behavior
as a trustor and as a trustee in a dyad. In the Appendix (Table A.1), we show that the
Tournament condition induces more pessimistic beliefs regarding both trust and amounts
returned. These effects are significant for the whole sample, but only significant for
the successful subgroup when differentiating by stage-1 outcome. That is, the stage-1
condition affects subjects’ beliefs. In tables 4.4 and 4.5 we investigate whether these beliefs
can explain the treatment effects on trust and trustworthiness. The tables provide four
specifications: Specifications 1 and 2 verify the raw comparisons discussed above including
various controls. Specifications 3 and 4 include beliefs about trust and trustworthiness.
We find a clear correlation between beliefs and behavior. For trust, beliefs about the
other person’s trust and her trustworthiness relate to higher trust. The latter effect makes
sense from a strategic point of view (expecting lower returns on trust), while the former
effect suggests a conditionally-cooperative or reciprocal view (conditioning on behavior
if the other person were in the trustor’s position). Results on trustworthiness support
the reciprocal view as well. Higher beliefs on amounts returned by the other player
relate to higher amounts returned. Because strategic aspects are absent for the second
mover, beliefs about the other person’s returns can only play a role in terms of reciprocal
thinking. Note that while beliefs play a role for both trustor and trustee behavior, the
main treatment effects of the Tournament condition remain substantial when including
the beliefs. That is, beliefs cannot fully explain the effect of unjust inequality on social
interactions.
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Table 4.4: Determinants of trust
Dependent variable: Transfer (yes/no) to second mover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tournament -0.178∗∗ -0.147 -0.133∗ -0.131
(-3.05) (-1.74) (-2.06) (-1.45)
male -0.082 -0.097 -0.059 -0.071
(-1.42) (-1.61) (-0.94) (-1.10)
Successful) 0.010 0.070
(0.13) (0.81)
Tournament x Successful -0.076 -0.006
(-0.63) (-0.05)
Belief in trust by other 0.428∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(6.64) (6.20)
returnbelief 0.046∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(3.27) (3.33)
Observations 294 282 294 282
Joint effect of tournament χ2=9.67, p < 0.01 χ2=4.05, p = 0.132
variable
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regression with robust z statistics in parentheses. All
regressions control for session size and location. Linear regressions support the sign of the
interaction term in the probit regressions. Belief in amount returned by other scaled to 100 cents.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.5: Determinants of amounts returned
Dependent variable: Amount returned in cents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tournament -101 -198∗∗ -40 -166∗∗
(-1.90) (-2.70) (-0.85) (-2.68)
male -215∗∗∗ -207∗∗∗ -170∗∗∗ -157∗∗∗
(-4.05) (-3.77) (-3.63) (-3.33)
Succesful -8 17
(-0.13) (0.31)
Tournament successful 167 253∗∗
(1.53) (2.80)
Belief in trust by other 13 22
(0.26) (0.44)
returnbelief 77∗∗∗ 84∗∗∗
(7.42) (8.62)
Observations 294 282 294 282
Joint effect of tournament F = 3.70, p = 0.026 F = 4.59, p = 0.011
variable
Notes: Tobin regressions with robustt statistics in parentheses. All regressions control
for session size and location. Linear regressions support the sign of the interaction terms
in the tobit regressions. Belief in amount returned by other scaled to 100 cents
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Pure inequality. While our design does not aim at disentangling the different aspects of
unjust inequality and the subsequent erosion of trust and trustworthiness, we can use
within-treatment variation in stage-1 earnings differences to obtain some insights into
the effects of pure inequality, i.e., inequality that is not necessarily perceived as unjust.
We define the earnings difference as the difference between a participant’s own and the
partner’s stage-1 earnings. We use the same specification as in the regressions in Tables
4.6 and 4.5 and include the earnings difference, or alternatively its absolute value. We do
this in the Piece Rate and Tournament conditions separately, and in the combined set
of observations. Note that in the Piece Rate condition, we can study the effect of pure
inequality absent the unjust and competitive allocation mode in Tournament. Although
inequality is less severe than in Tournament, in Piece Rate there were still 78 dyads with
a nonzero earnings difference, ranging from e0.05 to e4.10.
Table 4.6: Effect of pure inequality
Piece Rate Tournament All
Trust
Earnings difference
.01 -.003 -.003
(.31) (.78) (.75)
Earnings difference .1 -.013 -.017
(absolute value) (2.11)∗∗ (.82) (2.83)∗∗∗
Amounts returned
Earnings difference
-5 8 7
(.19) (1.79)∗ (1.76)∗
Earnings difference 39 -14 -12
(absolute value) (.91) (1.19) (2.09)∗∗
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient from a separate regression.
Marginal effects from probit regressions for Trust with robust z-stats
in parenthesis. Tobit regressions for Amounts Returned with robust t-
stats in parenthesis. Amounts are in cents and Earnings and Earnings
differences are scaled to 100 cents. All regressions control for session
size, location and gender. *,**,*** indicates significant difference from
zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 4.6 shows the coefficients for the earnings difference variables (each entry refers to
one separate regression). We do not find evidence of any negative effects of inequality
on stage-2 behavior within either the Piece Rate or the Tournament conditions. When
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combining the observations from the two treatments, the absolute value of the earnings
difference becomes significant and negative for both trust and amounts returned, capturing
the treatment effects between Piece Rate and Tournament. In sum, there is no evidence
that pure inequality is driving the observed negative social-interaction effects.
Equality of outcome versus equality of opportunity. In the Tournament condition, 8 dyads
ended up with an equal performance in the first round of the slider task. In this case, a
random draw determined the player who received the high payoff and the time bonus (vs.
low payoff and time penalty). Comparing random winners and losers, we find that random
winners tend to trust less but return more money, albeit the differences are insignificant
possibly due to low number of observations. Controlling for a random loss or win in the
regressions in tables 4.6 and 4.5 by including a dummy for bad and good luck, we find
that all results are qualitatively unaffected. There are no significant effects for random
winners and losers compared to other successful and unsuccessful. That is, the treatment
effects are not merely driven by a potential perception of the random draw (equality
of opportunity) being unfair compared to, for example, an equal split of the payment
(equality of outcome).
4.5 Results: Social-Interaction Effects in New Dyads
The comparison between Piece Rate and Tournament has revealed strong detrimental
effects on social interactions. In this section, we test the boundaries of this effect by
re-matching subjects into new dyads in stage 2. While the experience and perception of
competition and unjust inequality is identical to the Tournament condition (see results
of section 4.3), a direct attribution of “responsibility” for the mutual stage-1 outcomes is
absent in this condition. A negative attribution of high stage-1 earnings for the successful
to undeserved luck also becomes more difficult as effort information on the stage-1 dyad
is not available.57 The rematching of dyads allows us to distinguish between the role of
57Ko¨nig-Kersting et al. (2017) find that outcome information biases the perception of the underlying
process (“outcome bias”). They find that the bias is mainly driven by positive random outcomes being
falsely attributed to the decision maker’s skill. If this effect transfers to the current setting, we expect
that good stage-1 outcomes should more likely be attributed to skill, rather than luck, by stage-2
players.
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a player’s own income and the income of the matched partner: this was impossible in
Tournament because these incomes were perfectly correlated.
We first run simple probit/tobit regressions with treatment dummies (and controls) to
compare average behavior over all groups in Tournament-New (trust = 65%; amount
re-turned = e6.61) to Piece Rate (trust = 71%; amount returned = e6.41) and Tourna-
ment (trust = 53%; amount returned = e5.50). The results show that Tournament-New
does not differ significantly from Piece Rate, but leads to significantly larger trust and
generosity than Tournament (x ∈ X 2 = 4.82, p = .028 and x ∈ X 2 = 9.52, p = 0.02).
Table 4.7: Social interaction effects - Tournament-New
Participants vs. all vs. successful vs. unsuccessful
(1) (2) (3)
Trusting
All 65% 64% 64%
(n=342) (n=144) (n=144)
Successful 68% 71% 69%
(n=144) (n=56) (n=67)
Unsuccessful 62% 61% 55%
(n=144) (n=67) (n=56)
Amount returned
All e6.61 e6.49 e6.51
(n=342) (n=144) (n=144)
Successful e7.37 e7.96 e6.98#
(n=144) (n=56) (n=67)
Unsuccessful e5.74∗∗∗ e5.48∗∗∗ e5.52∗∗
(n=144) (n=67) (n=56)
Notes: *,**,*** indicates significant difference between successful and unsuccessful;
#,##,### indicates significant difference between successful partner and unsuccessful part-
ner at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, test of proportion for trust, and two-sided t-test for amounts
returned. Unclassified participants (n=54, i.e., those with an income between e12.00 and e1.20)
are excluded when conditioning on successful and unsuccessful decision maker or successful and
unsuccessful partner. This leads to different number of observations across cells, depending on
stage-2 matches with unclassified subjects.
Next, Table 4.7 shows detailed results for Trust and for Amounts Returned, separately for
successful and unsuccessful decision makers, and successful and unsuccessful partners in
the dyad. The upper panel of Table 4.7 shows trust behavior. There are no significant raw
differences in trust between the successful and the unsuccessful (column 1), and neither
between situations interacting with a successful partner (column 2), and an unsuccessful
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partner (column 3). However, there is a tendency to trust the stage-1 losers less and also
for the losers to trust less. Accordingly, trust within dyads of unsuccessful participants is
lower than trust within dyads of successful participants (55% vs. 71%, z = 1.77, p = 0.08).
Regressions reveal that winners are 12.4 percentage points more likely to trust others than
losers, which is a significant effect (see Table 4.8).
The lower panel of Table 4.7 shows that stage-1 winners are significantly more generous
as second movers than stage-1 losers are. This holds for interactions with other winners
and for interactions with losers. In fact, the successful in Tournament-New behave more
generously on average than the successful under the Piece-rate condition (7.37 vs 6.3,
p = 0.02, two-sided t-test). When matched with another stage-1 winner, winners give
even more to the partners in the dyad than when matched with a stage-1 loser (e7.96
vs. e6.98). As in the case of trust, these effects lead to an overall large difference of
generosity within the group of unsuccessful people versus the group of successful people
(e5.52 vs. e7.96, t = 3.56, p < 0.001).58
The result that dyads of stage-1 losers perform worst in terms of trust and trustworthiness
suggests that the detrimental effect of inequality on trust and trustworthiness is not driven
by inequality within dyads per se. Moreover, because of the reduced trust and trust-
worthiness within the group of dyads of stage-1 losers, stage-2 inequality is larger, and
stage-2 welfare is lower in this group compared to the winner dyads. The expected welfare
loss of the loser dyads amounts to e0.96, a 13% loss compared to the winner dyads. As in
the case of trust, a regression analysis shows that the winners return significantly higher
amounts in the trust game (Table 4.8).
Result 4: The detrimental effects of unjust inequality on social interactions are dampened
in newly assembled dyads. Negative effects derive mainly from interactions among the
unsuccessful.
A closer look at the participants’ beliefs explains the differences in trust game behavior
between Tournament and Tournament-New. Table 4.8 shows that the effect of beliefs on
58We can compare behavior in mixed dyads of successful matched with unsuccessful in Tournament-New
to the respective group in Tournament. We find that the successful are more trusting in Tournament-
New than in Tournament (p = 0.02) and equally trustworthy. The behavior of the unsuccessful does
not differ significantly between Tournament and Tournament-New.
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Table 4.8: Determinants of trust and amounts returned-Tournament-New
Trust Trust Amounts Amounts
Returned Returned
Successful 0.124∗ 0.141 234∗∗∗ 160∗∗∗
(2.00) (1.83) (4.18) (3.53)
Successful Partner 0.050 -0.062 56 -35
(0.79) (-0.82) (1.00) (-0.83)
male -0.127∗ -0.130 -88 -82
(-2.00) (-1.75) (-1.52) (-1.79)
Belief in trust by other 0.581∗∗∗ 122∗
(7.42) (2.08)
returnbelief 0.620∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗
(4.51) (6.08)
Observations 246 246 246 246
Marginal effects from probit regression for Trust with robust z statistics in parentheses. Tobit regressions for
Tobit regressions for Amounts Returned with robust t statistics in parentheses. Amounts are coded in cents.
All regressions control for session size and location. Belief in amount returned by other scaled to 100 cents.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
trust and amounts returned emerge in Tournament-New just as in Tournament. How-
ever, while in Tournament there were substantial negative effects of the stage-1 inter-
action on beliefs, especially for the winning partners, there are no such negative effects
in Tournament-New (see Appendix A.2). Moreover, in Tournament-New the success-
ful stage-1 players hold more positive views than the unsuccessful ones, especially when
paired with another successful person.
We also observe that social aspects must be relevant for the observed effects. That is,
the negative effects for the unsuccessful stage-1 dyads cannot simply derive from higher
risk aversion caused by their lower income. We observe negative effects for the loser
in both trust (potentially affected by risk attitude) and the non-strategic behavior as
second mover. Moreover, in the comparison between Piece Rate and Tournament, where
unsuccessful players were always matched with successful ones, there were no differences
between the two groups. In contrast, recent literature suggests that, if relative position is
salient, inequality may lead the poor to take higher levels of risk (see Payne et al., 2017,
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and references therein). We therefore interpret our results in terms of reduced levels of
social capital within groups of unsuccessful subjects, rather than in terms of risk attitudes.
4.6 Discussion
Our experiment investigates the potential negative effects of unjust economic inequality
on social interactions and focuses, in particular, on the role of the economically successful
in harming the social fabric. Our finding that unjust inequality arising in a competi-
tive environment has substantial effects on trust and trustworthiness supports the view
that such an environment might be detrimental to social interactions, well-being, and
more generally to social capital (Kawachi et al., 1997; Verhaeghe, 2014; Buser & Dreber,
2015).59 Increased pessimism about others’ willingness to cooperate and thus a lower
willingness to take the social risk of trusting a stranger is also indicative for a decline in
social capital. Indeed, we not only find that beliefs are correlated with behavior but also
that they are significantly more pessimistic if inequality is unjust. As a consequence, a
vicious cycle of decreasing trust and cooperation may result, leading to a substantial loss
of social capital.
Importantly, we find that the decline in trust and trustworthiness is mostly driven by
the less well-off. Thus, we find no evidence for the hypothesis that the behavior of the
successful is mainly responsible for the erosion of the social fabric. This is consistent with
recent findings of Camera et al. (2016). They report that the worse-off subjects discrimi-
nate against better-offs by cooperating less with them in a repeated helping game, even
when wealth is determined by chance, leading to an overall efficiency loss in the long run.
Zheng (2018) similarly reports a higher degree of selfish behavior in a team production
setting for low status subjects, where status is endowed in non-monetary terms (public
praise). In Table A3 in the appendix, we summarize a larger set of experimental studies
that relate to the question of the impact of inequality and competition on cooperation
59Besides negative economic consequences, limited social interaction between the poor and rich may also
increase the cultural gap between them. New evidence by Bertrand and Kamenica (2018) suggests that
media consumption, consumer behavior, and time use of the rich and poor in the US have not diverged
much since the 1960s despite the tremendous increase in income inequality, while social attitudes did
diverge.
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and trust. Although these studies greatly differ in terms of design, the overall picture is
consistent with negative social capital effects being more likely. However, the table shows
a rather mixed picture about which social status group may drive the observed effects.
That is, differences in implementation of inequality may be important for the relevant
channel driving social capital effects.
If the, arguably modest, degree of competition and unjust inequality in a lab setting can
induce strong effects on social behavior, we may expect the consequences to be even more
severe in more significant situations outside the lab. However, our results also hint to
the boundaries of such effects. Negative effects on trust and trustworthiness are overall
reduced if the interaction partner has not directly contributed to the existing income
inequality within a dyad. This happens despite the fact that subjects perceive the tour-
nament as equally unfair in the two Tournament conditions. At a first glance, this result
contradicts results in Buser and Dreber (2015) who report negative effects of competition
on cooperation even in newly assembled groups. In contrast toBuser and Dreber, how-
ever, subjects in our new-dyads condition were aware of their own and the other player’s
in-come situation. It seems likely that the apparent uncertainty about outcomes in Buser
and Dreber induces a behavior closer to our condition of fixed dyads. Indeed, positive
trust game effects emerge in the new-dyads condition especially in interactions between
two stage-1 winners, i.e., in a situation with high income and income equality. If informa-
tion about other’s income is absent, positive effects on trust (and trustworthiness) may
not be easily realized.
The observed differences between the fixed dyads and the newly assembled dyads hint
at the volatility of the subtle psychological effects caused by inequality or fairness cues.
Moreover, our manipulation combined strong inequality with a competitive and perceived
unjust payment scheme. We have argued that this key feature of our setup is relevant
in many contexts outside the lab such as in educational systems, labor markets or one’s
social environment (e.g., Chetty et al., 2011; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2006; Lemieux et
al., 2009). The more modest inequality emerging in condition Piece Rate is perceived as
fair and allows players to maintain a high level of trust and trustworthiness. The perceived
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justice of the institution from which unequal outcomes derive thus seems to constitute an
essential aspect. Our results lend support to Starmans, Sheskin, and Bloom (2017), who
argue that it is not inequality per se that bothers people in life, but economic unfairness.
Indeed, dyads of unsuccessful participants in Tournament-New score low on trust and
trustworthiness despite having equal outcomes; their experience of disadvantages caused
by unfair economic allocations seems to affect behavior, rather than inequality per se.
The finding of low social capital among the poor is consistent with field data on deprived
neighborhoods in the UK. Compared to wealthy neighborhoods, social capital is lower
in deprived neighborhoods, measured by interactions among people in the same neigh-
borhood and thus social class (Nettle et al., 2011). Our results suggest that these field
data may not simply caused by selection of people in or out of certain neighbor-hoods.
Nevertheless, selection and upbringing may be important in the field. For example, in
contrast with our and with Nettle et al.’s finding, Martinsson et al. (2015) report that
Colombian university students from a wealthy university are less cooperative among each
other than those at a lower social status university. The differences in upbringing and life
experiences seem to have an opposite effect in this sample compared to Nettle et al.’s UK
data.
A large literature in psychology has argued that rich, high-status individuals are less
generous in absolute terms than poor, low-status individuals (e.g. Piff et al., 2010; Piff
et al., 2012; Guinote et al., 2015). In particular, this literature makes the causal claim
that increasing wealth induces less social behavior. In correlational field data, the exis-
tence of a negative correlation between status and prosocial behavior has been questioned
(Trautmann et al., 2013), and various studies have recently shown that wealthy individ-
uals are often more prosocial and more generous in absolute terms (e.g. Andreoni et al.,
2017; Smeets et al., 2015), and also relative to their wealth position (Korndo¨rfer et al.,
2015). A negative causal effect of increased wealth and status on prosociality may still
exist, dampening an otherwise positive correlation between wealth and prosocial behavior
through a selection effect if the prosocial are economically more successful.
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In contrast to the results found in the above cited psychological literature, in our ex-
periment the better-off stage-1 winners are always more generous than the worse-off in
the second stage of the trustgame. Arguably, stage-1 losers should thus be more trusting
than the winners, expecting higher returns from trust. Yet, this is not the case. More-
over, in the Tournament-New condition we observe that unsuccessful when matched with
an-other unsuccessful subject are less trusting and less trustworthy than the successful
when matched with another successful. That is, overall welfare is reduced and a higher
degree of inequality emerges within their group of stage-1 losers. These results suggest
that negative effects of unjust inequality are driven by the behavior of the poor, rather
than the behavior of the rich.
Some qualifications need to be made with respect to the last point. Despite their higher
degree of generosity in absolute terms, the successful players still fall substantially short
of obvious normative benchmarks for second movers, such as equal sharing of the stage-2
payoffs, or even equal sharing of total experimental payoffs; they give a lower share of their
income compared to the poor. That is, while the successful are more prosocial, they fall
short of the potential normative expectations we may hold with respect to their behavior
(in contrast to the empirical expectations as measured in the experiment, which may turn
out more consistent with actual behavior). This is not the case for the poor, for whom no
such expectations exist in the current setup. The same is probably true in larger contexts
outside the lab. Such an expectation-behavior gap for the rich may explain the appeal of
picturing elites as immoral and selfish in popular discourses, which were eager to pick up
the results by Piff et al. (2012) and others supporting the view of the selfish elite.
4. Social Capital 134
Appendix
A.1 Instructions and Screen Shots
An English translation of the original instructions can be found online at
https://www.dropbox.com/s/21c7unjcko336ck/Merged%20Instructions%20%
28English%29.pdf?dl=0 (to prevent the current document from becoming exces-
sively large). The instructions also contain relevant screen shots with explanations. Here
we present the screenshot of the real-effort task as referred to in the main text.
Figure 4.2: Screen shot: slider task (42 sliders per round)
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A.2 Effects of Stage-1 Condition on Beliefs
Tables A 4.9 and A 4.10 show beliefs in treatments Piece Rate and Tournament, and
Tournament-New, respectively. Treatment comparisons find no significant differences be-
tween Piece rate and Tournament-New beliefs about trust (63% vs. 59%, p = 0.386) and
about amounts returned (e5.85 vs. e5.74, p = 0.676).
Table 4.9: Effects of stage-1 condition on trust game beliefs
Participants Piece Rate Tournament
Belief in Trust
by Other
all
63%
(n = 160)
50%∗∗
(n = 134)
successful
58%
(n = 75)
43%∗
(n = 63)
unsuccessful
68%
(n = 75)
56%∗
(n = 63)
Expected Amount
Returned by Other
all
e5.85
(n = 160)
e5.08∗∗
(n = 134)
successful
e5.69
(n = 78)
e4.36∗∗∗
(n = 63)
unsuccessful
e5.96
(n = 78)
e5.60##
(n = 63)
Notes: *,**,*** indicates significant difference between treatment;
#,##,### indicates significant difference between successful and un-
successful; at the 10%, 5%,1% level, two-sided t-test for amounts returned,
test of proportion for trust; pairs with equal earnings excluded in analyses of
successful and unsuccessful.
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Table 4.10: Effects of stage-1 condition on trust game beliefs - Tournament-New
Participants Piece Rate Tournament
Belief in Trust
by Other
all
59%
(n = 342)
63%
(n = 144)
54%
(n = 144)
successful
56%
(n = 144)
66%∗
(n = 56)
51%#
(n = 67
unsuccessful
61%
(n = 144)
63%∗
(n = 67)
59%
(n = 56
Belief in Amount
Returned by Other
all
e5.74
(n = 342)
e5.90
(n = 144)
e5.35∗∗
(n = 144)
successful
e6.04
(n = 144)
e6.91
(n = 56)
e5.40###
(n = 67)
unsuccessful
e5.33∗∗
(n = 144)
e5.44∗∗∗
(n = 67)
e4.93
(n = 56)
Notes: *,**,*** indicates significant difference between treatment; #,##,### indicates
significant difference between successful and unsuccessful; at the 10%, 5%,1% level, two-
sided t-test for amounts returned, test of proportion for trust; pairs with equal earnings
excluded in analyses of successful and unsuccessful.
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A.3 Experimental literature on inequality and competition
Table A3 presents laboratory experiments that study questions regarding the effect of
competition and inequality on social interaction. We concisely summarize the key study
aspects and the social interaction effect. If there exist any such effects, we indicate whether
they are driven by the behavior of the successful/rich or the unsuccessful/poor.
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Discussion and Conclusion
We now briefly summarize our results in view of the influence social preferences have
on decision making in our studies. More specific conclusions of the individual studies
have already been discussed in the respective chapters. We assess the impact of social
preferences by the degree of pro- and antisocial behavior observed. Concerning prosocial
(antisocial) behavior we refer to subjects, who accept a lower60 payoff for themselves
to increase (decrease) the payoff of the other person, they are interacting with. In our
first study in chapter 1, subjects are given the opportunity to costly destroy another
participant’s endowment. We can directly assess the degree of antisocial behavior by
the frequency of positive destruction decisions across all treatments. Decisions in the
bargaining task in chapter 2 could be influenced by strategic considerations and risk
preferences. It is thus not possible to disentangle effects on decisions based solely on
social preferences from those based on other factors. Therefore we do not consider it for
this analysis. In the study in chapter 3, subjects rank eight different payment pairs. We
categorize a subject as prosocial, if at least in one case she prefers61 an allocation where
she receives a lower payment and the other player a higher one compared to an alternative
allocation. This categorization applies the other way round also for antisocial behavior.
The mixed cases, in which both kinds of behavior are observed, are not counted for either
of the two categories. They mainly correspond to subjects, showing inequality-averse
behavior. In our last study in chapter 4, subjects play a Trust Game. Prosocial behavior
60Concerning the cases, in which subjects do not face own costs, it could either be that subjects are
indifferent with respect to the payoff of the other person, or they have social preferences as a tiebreaking
rule. As it is hard to distinguish these cases, both are considered as belonging to the category of selfish
preferences.
61This classification includes the case of indifference, as when being indifferent one potentially is willing
to forgo some own payoff.
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is measured by the number of cases, in which the trustee chooses to return a positive
amount of money to the first player. Results of all studies are summarized in the table
below:
Overview: Pro- and antisocial behavior
Number of Percentage of decisions being compatible with
decisions Prosocial Behavior Antisocial Behavior
Chapter 1 119 X 23,1%
Chapter 3 336 43,2% 2,2%
Chapter 4 342 84,2% X
Taken together, results indicate that social preferences have a substantial influence on
individual decision making. There is though great heterogeneity in the fractions across
studies. This suggests that behavior depends a lot on the exact framework and parameters.
The degree of antisocial behavior observed in chapter 1 is much higher than in chapter
3. There are two possible explanations: Firstly, the costs for decreasing another subject’s
payoff are considerably lower in chapter 1 than in chapter 3. Secondly, in chapter 1 this
is the only decision subjects can make. If in chapter 3 we classify the cases where the
reduction of others’ payoffs has no cost as antisocial behavior, this fraction would be
much higher. In chapter 4, prosocial behavior is very high, despite involving high costs.
But all of these cases correspond to situations in which the trustee has been transferred
a considerable amount of money beforehand. Thus, reciprocity seems to have a strong
impact. If we only count the cases as prosocial where the trustee returns more money than
the initial amount sent by the first mover, the percentage of subjects exhibiting prosocial
behavior would be much lower.Concerning the degree of social preferences underlying
subjects’ decisions, observed behavior can be seen as a lower bound. As there are specific
costs involved for each decision, subjects who under these conditions neither show pro-
nor antisocial behavior do not necessarily have selfish preferences. It could be the case
that they would conform with either of these types of behavior when there would be lower
costs involved.62.
62Results of study 3 suggest, a certain amount of subjects have pro- and antisocial preferences as tie
breaking mechanism. But as discussed beforehand, they are counted as belonging to the category of
selfish preferences.
Discussion and Conclusion 143
Finally, we discuss how to interpret the results of our lab experiments in assessing the
degree of social preferences in the real world. A lot has already been said about the
external validity of lab experiments. While Charness and Fehr (2015) take a rather
optimistic point of view, Levitt and List (2007) are more skeptical about the transferability
of results into the real-world. Levitt and List note several potential confounds on behavior,
such as the degree of scrutiny, representativeness of samples, low stakes and the decision-
making context. In contrast, Charness and Fehr, argue that all these aspects can in
principle be accounted for: Lab experiments have also been conducted with non-student
subjects and with high stakes. Moreover, many decisions in the field are observed by
other people as well and the context there is even harder to control. Taken together,
lab findings should be considered with caution as behavior in various studies does not
necessarily translate to similar results in the field. But it is nevertheless important to
investigate such questions in the lab to offer us some benchmark of understanding such
behavior.
Concerning social preferences in particular, Levitt and List provide evidence that due to
scrutiny the degree of prosocial behavior could be overestimated by lab experiments. The
extent of prosocial behavior usually is negatively correlated with the degree of anonymity.
But as people and institutions are strongly motivated by reputation effects, differences
can go in either direction, depending on the observability of one’s actions.63 In contrast
to experiments, in most situations in the real world it is legally not possible to reduce
someone else’s income or destroy someone else’s possessions. Thus, antisocial behavior
is probably much less pronounced in the field. Still, one could argue that this aspect
could be captured in the lab by an adequate cost function reflecting legal punishments.
For at least moderately high costs antisocial behavior is observed rather rarely in both
environments. However, one still observes a considerable degree of antisocial behavior in
experiments when costs are very low or zero.64 Fortunately, overall the number of people
exhibiting prosocial behavior is much higher than those engaging in antisocial behavior.
63See for example Hoffman et al., 1994 as well as Hoffman et al., 1996 for an analysis of giving behavior
in Dictator Games and Harbaugh (1998) for a study about the prestige motive in donating to charities.
64See the results of chapter 1 or those of other comparable experiments as for example Zizzo and Oswald
(2001),
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